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MOSQUE AND STATE IN IRAQ'S NEW CONSTITUTION
STEPHEN TOWNLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
On Saturday, October 15, 2005, the Iraqi people ratified their new
Constitution.' Despite this endorsement, many believe the Constitution is flawed.
Indeed, it has provoked hostility2 since its provisions became known late in August
* Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2006. Yale College, B.A. 2002. Thanks to Professors Jack
Balkin and Sandy Levinson. In writing this article, I drew on what I learned in Professor Noah
Feldman's pioneering class on Islamic constitutionalism. My gratitude also goes to the editors of the
Denver Journal of International Law & Policy for their heroic work in preparing this article for
publication. Thanks finally to Amanda Aikman and my family for their support and advice.
As this article moved through the editorial process, facts on the ground in Iraq continued to
change, often for the worse. See, e.g., Damien Cave, 7 Killed As Full-Scale Sectarian Fighting Rages
in Baghdad, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2006 1 write therefore to clarify two potential points of confusion.
First, although I advocate government cooperation with belief associations (see, e.g., infra notes 102-
104 and accompanying text), I do not endorse the creation or deployment of private sectarian militias.
Rather, my argument is that the Iraqi government should work with those belief associations willing to
join the political process, and encourage their competition with each other (as, for instance, the
government has worked with Muqtada al-Sadr, who has become considerably less radical since he
entered mainstream politics, see, e.g., Int'l Crisis Group, Iraq's Muqtada al-Sadr: Spoiler or
Stabiliser?, Aug. 16, 2006, available at
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/middle east north africa/iraqiran-gulf/55_iraqsm
uqtada al-sadr spoiler or stabiliser.pdf.). Cf. Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations July 11, 2006 (prepared testimony of Kenneth M. Pollack, Senior Fellow
and Director of Research, Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institute) (noting that
"[t]aking a page from Hizballah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories, the militias are
providing average Iraqis with a semblance of security, social services, health clinics, jobs, and whatever
else is required to gain their loyalty."). By contrast, the Iraqi government should restrain and
demobilize those groups, particularly heavily militarized groups, which refuse to participate in the
political process.
Second, I take no position on the extrinsic, or general, merit of government establishment of
one particular religion or cooperation with non-dominant belief associations. My argument is unique to
Iraq today. I take no firm position on the role religion should play in the United States, elsewhere in the
Middle East (although Hizballah's ability to survive devastating Israeli air strikes suggests the futility of
attempts to eradicate religious parties entirely), or in Iraq in the future.
I. See Kirk Semple & Robert F. Worth, Early Signs Show Iraqis' Approval of
Constitution, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2005, at A6.
2. Compare IRAQ CONST. art. 61(c) (Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the
Transitional Period), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html (Mar. 8, 2004)
(declaring that if two-thirds of the voters in any three provinces were to reject the Constitution, it would
not be adopted, thereby confirming the fact that Sunnis have the ability to veto any constitution that is
not to their liking) with Iraq, Still Divided After Three Deadlines, THE ECONOMIST: GLOBAL AGENDA,
Aug. 29, 2005, available at http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?storyid=4334638
(affirming that Sunnis are a majority in four provinces). See also Juan Cole, The Iraqi Constitution:
DOA?, SALON.COM, Aug. 26, 2005, at http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/08/26/sunnis
(explaining that the Sunnis levied attacks on both the substance of the Constitution and the procedure
pursuant to which it was drafted, and claiming that "[m]ore than anything else, the Sunnis oppose the
plans of the Kurdistan Provincial Confederation and the mooted Shiite Provincial Confederation
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2005.3 Characteristic of this early response are the reactions of Sheik Abdul
Rahman Mished, who said, "Kirkuk's Arabs refuse any constitution that would
divide the country by different names, which is at odds with Islam and with the
Arabic nation of Iraq,",4 and Abdul-Nasser al-Janabi, who exclaimed, "[w]e declare
that we don't agree and we reject the articles that were mentioned in the draft and
we did not reach consensus on them in what makes the draft illegitimate."5 The
hostility has not abated since the referendum 6 and may have even aggravated
divisions expected to heal.7
In the United States, in the weeks between when the document was translated
into English and the referendum, pundits focused on, and reserved their most
vituperative language for, the role the Constitution assigns Islam--establishing it as
the religion of the state. David L. Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations
opined, "[t]he Constitution pits Islamists against secularists, Shia against Sunnis..
. . The 'new Iraq' is a far cry from what President Bush had in mind when he
promised freedom to the Iraqi people.",8 Likewise, the editorial board of the New
York Times declared, "[p]rovisions that could strip away the legal rights of Iraqi
women have been left unchanged [in the Constitution]. The chances of this
language being interpreted benignly by a future legislature dominated by Shiite
religious parties or a future Supreme Court packed with senior clerics is [sic] less
than nil." 9 Since the referendum, these observers have reiterated this criticism.'0
('Sumer') to keep substantial amounts of the petroleum profits in the regions rather than sharing them");
Robert H. Reid, U.S. Envoy: Iraq Constitution May Change, (Aug. 30, 2005),
http://dehai.org/archives/AWnewsarchive/0352.html (noting that Sunnis also objected to the
Constitutional purge of the Baath Party, the former ruling, and heavily Sunni, party of Iraq, and to the
designation of Iraq as an Islamic, but not Arab nation). Cf Noah Feldman, Agreeing to Disagree in
Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2005, at A19 (arguing that "[t]he major problem is one of who is agreeing,
not what they have agreed on").
3. See Dexter Filkins & James Glanz, Shiites and Kurds Halt Charter Talks With Sunnis,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A6 (discussing the publication of the Constitution in draft form).
4. Robert F. Worth, Sunni Arabs Rally to Protest Proposed Iraqi Constitution, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A3.
5. Iraq's Sunnis Reject Constitution, BBC NEWS, Aug. 28, 2005, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/lI/hi/world/middleeast/4192122.stm.
6. See, e.g., Sabrina Tavernise & Edward Wong, Two Sides of the Sunni Vote: Deserted
Polls and Long Lines, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/10/16/international/middleeast/16sunni.html (describing the views of
Falluja residents, one of whom said, "[i]t's forbidden to vote yes because it contradicts Islamic law");
see also Hatem Mukhlis, Voting 'Yes' to Chaos, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/l0/18/opinion/1 8mukhlis.html?hp.
7. NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, IRAQ'S
CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM 2 (2005), available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/brown8-3I4.pdf [hereinafter IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL
CONUNDRUM]
8. David L. Phillips, Constitution Process Risks a Civil War, available at
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8766/constitution-process-risks-a-civil-war.html (Aug. 26, 2005); see
also IRAQ'S CONSTITUTIONAL CONUNDRUM, supra note 7, at 3 (noting that the Constitution would
likely permit Shiite religious leaders to dominate at the polls).
9. The Fragments of Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A12. See generally Hannibal
Travis, Freedom or Theocracy?: Constitutionalism in Afghanistan and Iraq, 3 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM.
RTS. 4 (2005) (describing and endorsing criticism of earlier versions of the Constitution).
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Yet there are both ethical and practical reasons for the United States to
approve those provisions of the new Constitution addressing religion and Islam.
As Noah Feldman has explained in a recent book, we owe an ethical duty to the
Iraqi people." Feldman enumerates three roles for the "nonpaternalistic nation
builder": 1) to impose security; 12 2) support the freedoms of speech and
assembly;' 3 and 3) insure the participation of all relevant stakeholders in important
negotiations.' 4 Essentially, the role of outsiders like the United States is to assist in
the processes of state and nation construction.
This is not only an ethical duty; it is also a practical imperative. 15 The sooner
the United States can withdraw from Iraq, the better.' 6 But it is only when Iraqis
have built both state and nation that Baghdad will be safe and U.S. troops able to
withdraw. Larry Diamond, an advisor to the Coalition Provisional Authority,
emphasizes state building. One point he makes is that people are afraid of more
than the state; they are also afraid of loosing their freedom through the absence of
order. He argues that before Iraq can become a democracy "it must first become a
state, which establishes a monopoly on the means of violence."' 17 Toby Dodge, on
the other hand, highlights the importance of nation building.' 8 In 2004, he warned
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that Iraq's "largely atomized society"
would have to come together for the U.S. mission to succeed.' 9
Accepting Feldman's thesis-that the United States is ethically required to
work to help Iraqis build a state and construct a nation, and my extension of it-
that it behooves the United States to do as Feldman urges, the worth of the new
Constitution from the U.S. perspective will vary according to how well it advances
state- and nation-building efforts. 20 In this article, I offer a preliminary assessment
of that worth. I focus only on those provisions of the Constitution that relate to
10. See, e.g., Phyllis Bennis, The Iraqi Constitution: A Referendum for Disaster, Institute
for Policy Studies, at http://www.ips-dc.org/comment/Bennis/tp34constitution.htm (Oct. 13, 2005)
(arguing that "religious rights ... remain at risk").
It. See NOAH FELDMAN, WHAT WE OWE IRAQ: WAR AND THE ETHICS OF NATION
BUILDING 64 (2004) [hereinafter WHAT WE OWE IRAQI.
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 66.
14. Id. at 83 (claiming that "we can guarantee that all Iraqis get a seat at the table").
15. See Stephen Townley, Foreword, Perspectives on Nation-Building, 30 YALE J. INT'L L.
357, 359-62 (2005) (explaining the practical importance of creating a nation and building a state).
16. Withdrawal is important not only because U.S. soldiers are dying every day in Iraq but
also because recent empirical data suggests that suicide terrorism is fueled by U.S. military policies.
See ROBERT A. PAPE, DYING TO WIN 246-50 (2005).
17. LARRY DIAMOND, SQUANDERED VICTORY 315-16 (2005).
18. See generally TOBY DODGE, INVENTING IRAQ: THE FAILURE OF NATION-BUILDING
AND A HISTORY DENIED (2003).
19. Iraq Transition: Civil War or Civil Society: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on Foreign
Relations at 4 (Apr. 20, 2004) (statement of Dr. Toby Dodge), available at
http://www.foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2004/DodgeTestimonyO4O4
2 0.pdf.
20. 1 do not mean to engage with the deeper debate over the morality or practical merit of
providing assistance to Iraq as it develops and refines its Constitution. That debate is captured by a
recent interchange between Noah Feldman and Madhavi Sunder. Compare Noah Feldman, Imposed
Constitutionalism, 37 CONN. L. REV. 857 (2005), with Madhavi Sunder, Enlightened Constitutionalism,
37 CONN. L. REV. 890 (2005).
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religion, both because they are among the most controversial in the United States21
and because they have great potential to affect the state- and nation-building
processes.22
In the first half of the article, I contend that Iraqis can most easily build a state
and construct a nation if they cooperate with religious groups, as the Constitution
permits and impels them to do. I also argue that such cooperation is inconceivable
unless the Constitution establishes Islam as the religion of the government, as it
does. In the second half of the article, I take up another question: that of the rights
due minorities and the requisite corollaries to cooperation and establishment. I
suggest that Iraq should make a concomitant commitment to protect Muslim
dissenters, those who neither want to abandon their Islamic faith nor accept the
dictates of the Muslim majority without question. I lay out practical steps the Iraqi
polity could take-including laws it could pass and judicial structures it could
adopt-to realize such a commitment. In sum, the thesis of this article is that U.S.
hostility to the new Constitution is misguided. I argue that the United States
should instead refocus its energy on spurring Iraq to take steps to protect Muslim
dissenters.
This article is sited at the intersection of policy and theory. The article could
be useful to U.S. diplomats and policymakers. To date, U.S. lawyers and legal
academics have not offered policymakers much assistance.23 This article aims to
remedy that failure and help U.S. policymakers prepare for the critical next two
years of Iraq's constitutional and legal development.
The article also makes three theoretical contributions to legal scholarship.
First, I offer a rebuttal to those who argue that the best way to render Islamic states
more tolerant is by reinterpreting and re-imagining Islam.24  Islamic
constitutionalism is a burgeoning field.2 ' But even after roughly ten years, most
21. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
22. We can learn from Lebanon, an object lesson in the power of religious conflict to
cripple a state and divide a nation. See generally KAMAL SALIBI, A HOUSE OF MANY MANSIONS: THE
HISTORY OF LEBANON RECONSIDERED (1990).
23. Indeed, Sherman Jackson has shrewdly noted, "[o]ne of the limitations built into the
study of Islamic law in the West is that the majority of scholars of Islamic law are products of Area
Studies programs and have little to no training in law as a discipline." Sherman A. Jackson, Shari'ah,
Democracy, and the Modern Nation-State: Some Reflections on Islam, Popular Rule, and Pluralism, 27
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 91 (2003). Two exceptions are Noah Feldman and Kristin Stilt. See NOAH
FELDMAN, AFTER JIHAD: AMERICA AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ISLAMIC DEMOCRACY 54 (2003)[hereinafter AFTER JIHAD]; WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11; Kristin A. Stilt, Islamic Law and the
Making and Remaking of the Iraqi Legal System, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 695 (2004). But
Feldman speaks primarily in abstract terms and Stilt writes from a historical perspective.
24. See, e.g., ABDUALLAHI AHMED AN-NAIM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION 34(1996) ("[Naskh, the Islamic principle of abrogationJ would permit applying some verses of Qur'an
and accompanying Sunna instead of others."); Azizah al-Hibri, Islamic and American Constitutional
Law: Borrow Possibilities or a History of Borrowing?, I U. PA. J. CONST. L. 492, 513 (1999)
(discussing the Prophet Muhammad's tolerance for Jews).
25. "Islamic constitutionalism" is a term of recent provenance. By it I mean scholarship
concerned with the customs, ideals and norms on the basis of which constitutions are written and that
buttress those constitutions. Cf Bassam Tibi, Islam and Modern European Ideologies, 18 INT'L J.
MIDDLE E. STUD. 15, 16 (1986). Recent works on Islamic constitutionalism include NATHAN J.
BROWN, CONSTITUTIONS IN A NONCONSTITUTIONAL WORLD 92 (2002); WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra
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scholars still seem content to look backward, tracing principles of tolerance
through Islamic history.26 As Erik Jensen has said, contemporary scholars "look[]
superficially at selected passages from the Quran, the Constitution of Medina, as
well as concepts and practices such as shura, i'ma and maslaha, and pour[] Islam
into liberal democratic vessels. 27  I take the Shari'a and unwritten Islamic
constitution as I find them and explain how they can usefully be used to promote
tolerance. Second, I describe a new way to conceptualize the relationship between
religion and government. Although much ink has been spilled on the question, no
one, to my knowledge, has mapped this relationship in two dimensions, rather than
in one.28 I do so. Third and finally, I strive to contribute to the ongoing discussion
of the utility of comparative law.29 I am fully expert in few of the areas of law I
discuss. I am neither verifying a theory nor building one immediately susceptible
of falsification. 30 Rather, by discussing and comparing constitutional experiences
proximate to Iraq's, such as that of Egypt, and distant from Iraq's, such as that of
the Netherlands, I hope first to debunk a popular perception (that the establishment
of Islam as the religion of Iraq is a recipe for disaster),3' second, to tentatively
explore the role religion should play in Iraq,32 and third, to show, by example, how
note 11; AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23; SHERMAN JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHAB AL-DIN AL-QARAFI (1996); Khaled Abou EI-Fadl,
Constitutionalism and the Islamic Sunni Legacy, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 67 (2001-02);
Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democratic Commitment, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 4
(2003); and Sherman Jackson, From Prophetic Action to Constitutional Theory: A Novel Chapter in
Medieval Muslim Jurisprudence, 25 INT'L J. OF MIDDLE E. STUD. 71 (1993).
26. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 23, at 73-74 (deriving a new principle of Islamic
interpretation from the work of medieval philosopher lbn Qayyim).
27. Erik G. Jensen, Confronting Misconceptions and Acknowledging Imperfections: A
Response to Khaled Abou El Fadl's 'Islam and Democracy', 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 81, 83 (2003).
28. Professor Garlicki has come the closest to making this point. He has noted, "there is a
range of systems from the most strict - even hostile - separationist models to the most friendly, positive
separationist schemes. This range includes models based on accommodation, cooperation, and even
churches supported or preferred by the state." Leszek Lech Garlicki, Perspectives on Freedom of
Conscience and Religion in the Jurisprudence of Constitutional Courts, 2001 BYU L. REV. 467, 469.
29. Compare KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW
(3d ed. 1998) (assuming that countries should adopt similar law to deal with similar problems) with
Mark Tuhsnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L. J. 1225 (1999)
(articulating a cautious approach to constitutional borrowing) and Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,
628, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 1229 (Scalia, J., dissenting) and Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of Legal
Transplants, 4 MAASTRICHT J. OF EUROPEAN & COMP. L. 111-24 (1997).
30. Cf GARY KING ET AL., DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY (1994) (arguing for rigorous theory
development and testing).
31. For an example of another effort to "debunk" a popular myth, see James Q. Whitman,
The Two Western Cultures of Privacy, 113 YALE L.J. 1151 (2004) (discussing the myth that there is one
international, universal conception of privacy).
32. See Alexander George, Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method of
Structured Comparison, in DIPLOMACY: NEW APPROACHES IN HISTORY, THEORY AND POLICY 51
(1979) (noting that comparative studies can be useful "as a means of stimulating the imagination in
order to discern important new general problems, identify possible theoretical solutions"). Cf. Harry
Eckstein, Case Study and Theory in Political Science, in THE HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL SCIENCE at 91
(1975) (discussing hypothesis formulation).
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Iraqis might better understand their own system by looking to other countries. 3
Before laying out the structure of this article, I want to define a few important
terms and offer a brief caveat. A "state" is a territorial entity that provides
essential services (including security). The state should assure freedoms of speech
and assembly. The state should also assure the full participation conducive to
national legitimacy. A "nation" is a sociological and legal idea to which those
who live within the territory of a state may or may not subscribe. "Government"
means something different than either "state" or "nation." The government is the
set of actors able at any given time to effect policy. Finally, a "belief
association" 34 is a group of individuals who hold common and sincere beliefs3 that
help to define their relationships to other men, to the universe, or to God.36 This
term is broad and I mean it to include both religious and quasi-religious groups,
like, for instance, scientologists and Jehovah's Witnesses. I do not intend it to
include, however, the Church of No Taxation. Rather, a "belief association"
facilitates and passes on "demands made upon us by society, the people, the
sovereign, or God .... [It offers a set of symbols and] signs by which each of us
communicates with others."
37
Finally, I articulate this theory rather forcefully at least in part in an effort to
stimulate a discussion on the merits of the new Iraqi constitution. I offer this
caveat: this article is neither exhaustive nor comprehensive. Rather, I have simply
tried to generate plausible arguments and apply them to the Iraqi Constitution. My
hope is that this article will stimulate further discussion within the U.S. legal
community.
This article proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I set the stage for argument by
modeling the relationship between governments and belief associations in a new
way: along two axes rather than along a single vector, with a government's
position along the x-axis representing the extent to which it prefers one belief
association (or indeed secularism) to other belief associations, and its position
along the y-axis representing the extent to which it is willing actively to cooperate
with non-dominant belief associations.
With this model in mind, in Part II I defend the way the Iraqi Constitution
33. Cf J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, Ill HARV. L.
REV. 963, 1005 (1998) (arguing that the purpose of comparative study it to "make the object ...
'strange' to us").
34. By using this term, and defining it in the way I do, I hope to avoid offering a definition
of "religion." To attempt any definition of "religion" might debase it and offend those whom the
definition excluded. Cf Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 241 (1999) ("To define religion is to limit it."). I also do not feel
competent to make the attempt. Compare Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional
Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753 (1984), with Jonathan Weiss, Privilege, Posture and Protection: 'Religion' in
the Law, 73 YALE L.J. 593 (1964) with Ingber, supra.
35. By sincere I mean what the Supreme Court meant in United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S.
163, 176 (1965) and Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340 (1970).
36. To some extent, I endorse the definition offered by Judge Augustus Hand in United
States v. Kauten, 133 F.2d 703, 708 (2d Cir. 1943) ("[r]eligious belief arises from a sense of the
inadequacy of reason as a means of relating the individual to his fellow-men and to his universe..
37. Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 8 (1983).
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treats religion. I do so by articulating what I call the privilege paradigm. I suggest
that the two principal U.S. desiderata-the establishment of a state and the
construction of a nation--can best be realized if Iraq privileges religion. Using the
model, Iraq should not only cooperate with non-dominant belief associations (i.e.
be above the origin on the y-axis) but also entrench Islam as the religion of the
government (i.e. be to the right of the origin on the x-axis). I assert that this is
precisely what the Constitution requires and impels Iraq to do.
In Parts III and IV, I turn from the descriptive to the prescriptive. I no longer
defend the Constitution as it is, but rather, announce how I believe the United
States should suggest that the Iraqi government interpret it and what ancillary laws
and practices might help assure its success. First, in Part ILL, I enunciate what I call
the protection paradigm. 38 The protection paradigm is a scheme designed to
guarantee that neither the cooperation of the government with non-dominant belief
associations nor the entrenchment of Islam as its religion stifles dissent. Using the
feminist critique of the position I endorse in Part II to help limn the contours of the
protection paradigm, I argue that the state should ensure that citizens are able to
express dissenting opinions from within belief associations. Then, in Part IV, I
apply the theoretical insights of Part III and explain precisely what the United
States could suggest that Iraq do, should they wish to realize the protection
paradigm.
To sum up, the privilege paradigm suggests that the Iraqi government has
done well by approving the beliefs of the majority while at once ensuring that non-
dominant belief associations can prosper and that the dominant belief association
will continue to face competition for believers; but the protection paradigm
requires that the government take care that each belief association be permitted to
evolve, pressed from within by its own rebels. The Iraqi government still has
much work to do to instantiate this second paradigm.
I. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND BELIEF ASSOCIATIONS: A
NEW MODEL
A. Two Dimensional Analysis
Many scholars, including Noah Feldman, model the relationship between
governments and belief associations as a vector moving from disestablishment to
establishment. In a description of the three shapes Islamic democracy might take,
for instance, Feldman moves from the minimally Islamic state (Islam is to that
state as Anglicanism is to England)39 to the maximally Islamic state (a state that
"adopt[s] Islamic law as its exclusive legal system"). 40  This Part proposes a
38. 1 borrow this term from Christopher Eisgruber and Lawrence Sager. Christopher L.
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Mediating Institutions: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction: The
Vulnerability of Conscience: the Constitutional Basis for Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1245, 1248 (1994).
39. AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23, at 54.
40. Id. at 55-56.
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different way of modeling this relationship. Rather than as a vector,4' this Part
models the relationship in two dimensions. At one end of the x-axis is
establishment or disestablishment. A government that has disestablished religion,
like a government that has established religion, favors one belief association (or,
more generally, one belief structure) over others. At the origin is what I will call
agnosticism. At one end of the y-axis is hostility, at the origin is neutrality, and at
the other end is cooperation [see Table One below].
TABLE ONE
CooNeratyo
Neutraitv Agnosticism
Germany
The Netherlands
Spain
Israel
United States
- Favoritism
England
Russia (Soviet Union)
Pakistan/TurkeyFrance
41. See W.C. Durham, Jr., Perspectives on Religious Liberty: A Comparative Framework,
in RELIGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE: LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 15-25 (Johan D. van der
Vyver & John Witte, Jr. eds. 1996) [hereinafter WITTE] for another formulation of the vector model.
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Both England and Israel are at one end of the x-axis since both states favor one
belief structure over others.4 2 England, for instance, permits twenty-four bishops
to serve as members of the House of Lords. 3 Turkey and France are similarly
situated along the x-axis (since both endorse laicit6/secularism over other belief
structures). 44  Indeed, the Turkish government has dismissed employees who
belong to fundamentalist groups without adducing evidence of the effect such
membership may have had upon job performance.4 5
Spain and the United States, by contrast, are closer to the origin (along the x-
axis) since both favor a single belief association over others (in the case of Spain
the Catholic Church and in the case of the United States 'civic religion'), but only
informally.4 6 In Spain, for instance, religious education classes taught by members
of belief associations other than the Catholic Church are not publicly funded.
47
Finally, at the other end of the x-axis, near the y-axis, are those governments that
are agnostic, those states like the Netherlands and Germany that do not favor one
belief association over others at all.4 8  For those governments, "religious
institutions must not be placed in a more disadvantageous position than societal
groups. ' 49 Yet, "the system of church and state relationships is characterized...
as one of separation."
50
The y-axis measures the extent to which a government cooperates with non-
dominant belief associations. Pakistan is at one end since it is hostile to belief
associations other than the dominant belief association (Sunni Islam). 5' For
instance, until recently, the government of Pakistan required Muslims entering and
leaving the country to affirm that Muhammad was the 'seal of the prophets,'
42. See, e.g., Asher Maoz, Religious Human Rights in the State of Israel, in WITTE, supra
note 41, at 357 ("Israel was established as a Jewish state."); Shimon Shetreet, State and Religion:
Funding of Religious Institutions - The Case of Israel in Comparative Perspective, 13 ND J. L. ETHICS
& PUB POL'Y 421, 431 (1999) ("'The process of establishment means that the state has accepted the
Church [of England] as the religious body in its opinion truly teaching the Christian faith."').
43. David McClean, State and Church in the United Kingdom, in STATE AND CHURCH IN
THE EUROPEAN UNION 307, 311 (Gerhard Robbers ed., 1996) [hereinafter ROBBERS].
44. See ANAYASA [Constitution] art. 2 (Turkey); CONST. art. 2 (France).
45. Cf Kalac v. Turkey, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1199 (1997-IV).
46. See Constituci6n [C.E.] art. 16(3) (Spain) ("The public powers shall take into account
the religious beliefs of Spanish society and maintain the appropriate relations of cooperation, with the
Catholic Church and other denominations."); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 595 n.46
(1989) (mentioning "ceremonial deism").
47. Ivan C. Iban, State and Church in Spain, in ROBBERS, supra note 43, at 107.
48. STATUUT NED. [Constitution] art. 6(1) (Kingdom of the Netherlands) ("Everyone shall
have the right to manifest freely his religion or belief, either individually or in community with others");
GRUNDSETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 4(1) (F.R.G.) ("Freedom of creed, of conscience, and freedom to
profess a religious or non-religious faith are inviolable").
49. Gerhard Robbers, State and Church in Germany, in ROBBERS, supra note 43, at 60
(describing Germany).
50. Sophie C. van Bijsterveld, State and Church in the Netherlands, in ROBBERS, supra
note 43, at 215.
51. See generally M. Nadeem Ahmad Siddiq, Enforced Apostasy: Zaheeruddin v. State and
the Official Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan, 14 LAW & INEQ. J. 275 (1995); see
also Donna E. Arzt, Religious Human Rights in Muslim States of the Middle East and North Africa, 10
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 139, 153-54 (1996).
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thereby forcing the Ahmadis, who consider themselves Muslim but believe in
subsequent revelation, either to recant or to declare themselves non-Muslims.
England and the United States are both near the x-axis, but England is below the x-
axis (it is more hostile, especially to groups like the Sikhs) 52 whereas the United
States is above the x-axis (it is more willing to cooperate, especially with groups
like the Old Order Amish). 3 Finally, at the other end of the y-axis are Germany
and the Netherlands. These states believe that "[c]hurch and state-throne and
altar- . . . hav[e] different responsibilities, but they both have public
responsibilities . and thus cooperation between the two works to the benefit of
society as a whole. 54 These cooperative states strive to "maintain a sphere of
positive tolerance that makes room for the religious needs of society., 55
I will now render two examples in more detail, in the hope of clarifying the
model. First consider Russia. Russia is in the bottom right-hand comer of my
graph because it comes closest to combining agnosticism with hostility. Russia is
at once predominantly Orthodox and a "secular state., 56 But it neither embraces
secularism,57 at least in part because secularism is tainted by its association with
the Soviet past,58 nor Orthodoxy.59 Indeed, as one commentator has put it, Russia
"forbid[s] 'the propaganda of exclusiveness' of religious communities [and this] is
to impose an extremely harsh constraint on the preaching of . . . the main
religion[].,, 60 Russia is not only agnostic, it is also hostile to non-dominant belief
associations. For instance, the government seems to discriminate against minority
religious groups.61 Moreover, there is no doubt that the Federal Law on
52. See generally Satvinder S. Juss, The Constitution and Sikhs in Britain, 1995 BYU L.
REV. 481.
53. Cf Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1971).
54. THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES 171
(Stephen v. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds. 1997) [hereinafter MONSMA].
55. Robbers, supra note 49, at 60.
56. See KONST. (Constitution) art. 14 [Russian Federation] available at
http://www.constitution.ru/en/10003000-01.htm ("1. The Russian Federation is a secular state. No
religion may be established as a state or obligatory one. 2. Religious associations shall be separated
from the State and shall be equal before the law.").
57. Indeed, Russia guarantees freedom of belief more extensive than that guaranteed by the
United States. See KONST. (Constitution) arts. 29(1), (3) [Russian Federation] ("1. Everyone shall be
guaranteed the freedom of ideas and speech .... 3. No one may be forced to express his views and
convictions or to reject them."); see also, J. Brian Gross, Note, Russia's War on Political and Religious
Extremism: An Appraisal of the Law 'On Counteracting Extremist Activity," 2003 BYU L. REV. 717,
750 ("The 1990 law created a fairly liberal regime that promoted the growth of foreign religious
organizations and, in some instances, led to a rise in religion-related abuses.")
58. The Soviet Constitution proclaimed, "[c]itizens of the USSR are guaranteed freedom of
conscience ... [but] the church is separated from the state, and the school from the church." KONST.
(Constitution) art. 52 [U.S.S.R.]). While "all Soviet citizens who profess[ed] any form of religious
belief [we]re placed on the same footing as all the other citizens who, pursuant to their right under
article 52, [might] elect to become atheists," the Soviet Constitution "embodie[d] a distinct political
ideology as well as a secular theology," Christopher Osakwe, Equal Protection of Law in Soviet
Constitutional Law and Theory -A Comparative Analysis, 59 TUL. L. REV. 974, 1000 (1985).
59. See Gross, supra note 57, at 717.
60. Alexander Verkhovsky, Taking Anti-Extremism to Extremes, Johnson's Russia List, at
http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/6401 
-1 .cfm (Aug. 14, 2002).
61. Putin's Anti-Extremism Drive Is Failing, Rights Group Charges, 3 BIGOTRY MONITOR,
at http://www.fsumonitor.com/stories/013103Russia.shtml (Jan. 31, 2003) ("For example . .. when a
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Counteracting Extremist Activity62 throws a damper on the work of belief
associations.
Consider next the United States. The United States, because it favors civic
religion and cooperates with non-dominant belief associations to a limited extent,
is well to the right of and slightly above the origin on my graph. The United States
government endorses what sociologist Robert Bellah calls civil religion 63 -that is,
"a set of beliefs and attitudes that explain the meaning and purpose of any given
political society in terms of its relationship to a transcendent, spiritual reality, that
are held by the people generally of that society, and that are expressed in public
rituals, myths and symbols. ' '64 Indeed, government officials frequently advert to
'our Christian heritage' 65 and rely on religious symbols in public ceremonies. 66 As
Justice O'Connor has explained, religious images may "serve, in the only ways
reasonably possible in our culture .. .[to] solemniz[e] public occasions, express
confidence in the future, and encourag[e] the recognition of what is worthy of
appreciation in society. ' ' 7 Although civic religion is not as obvious a dominant
belief structure as, say, Islam is in Pakistan,68 there is no doubting that the United
group of Orthodox believers objected to the use of mandatory tax identification numbers on religious
grounds, a court ruled to exempt them. But when Muslim women asked to wear their traditional
headscarves in their passport photographs, a court ruled that the Interior Ministry ban on head coverings
in ID photos took precedence over their faith.").
62. See Gross, supra note 57, at 717.
63. Bellah has defined American religion as "an elaborate and well institutionalized civil
religion [i.e.] certain common elements of religious orientation that the general majority of Americans
share [and that] have played a crucial role in the development of American institutions and still provide
a religious dimension for the whole fabric of American life, including the political sphere." Robert
Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1, 24 (1967), quoted in Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil
Religion and the Establishment Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237, 1248 (1986).
64. E.M. West, A Proposed Neutral Definition of Civil Religion, 22 J. OF CHURCH & STATE
23, 39 (1980), quoted in Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1249.
65. John Quincy Adams, addressing the American people, once said, "the ark of your
covenant is the Declaration of Independence. Your Mount Ebal, is the confederacy of separate state
sovereignties, and your Mount Gerizim is the Constitution of the United States." H. Wayne House, A
Tale of Two Kingdoms: Can There Be Peaceful Coexistence of Religion with the Secular State, 13 BYU
J. PUB. L. 203, 205 (1999) (quoting The Jubilee of the Constitution, A Discourse Delivered at the
Request of the New York Historical Society in the City of New York, on Tuesday, the 30th of April,
1839, Being the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Inauguration of George Washington as the President of the
United States, on Thursday, the 30th Of April, 1789; by John Quincy Adams (Entered According to the
Act of Congress, in the Year 1839, by Joseph Blunt, for the New York Historical Society, in the District
Court of The Southern District of New York). More recently, Justice Douglas has pointed out, "[w]e are
a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being." Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306,
313 (1952).
66. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794 (1983) (Nebraska's employment of a
chaplain to open each legislative session with a prayer is not a violation of the Establishment Clause).
In this respect, the government is simply responsive to recent polls, which suggest, "94% of Americans
believe in God or a universal spirit, 71% believe in heaven, and 53% believe in hell." Michael M.
Maddigan, The Establishment Clause, Civil Religion, and the Public Church, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 293,
294 (1993).
67. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For more on
the Supreme Court's willingness to acknowledge our religious past, see Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1245
("The legitimate functions of government are defined ... by what government is already doing, without
any reference to the substantive content and constitutional value of the activity in question.")
68. Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1250 ("A ... characteristic of civil religion is its essentially
political, non-sacral character.")
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States favors it over all others.69
The United States occasionally, but not always, cooperates with non-
dominant belief associations. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has excepted
the Old Order Amish from educational requirements.7 ° Other sects, on the other
hand, have not fared so well. The Mormons, for instance, were subject to
considerable persecution.7' Some argue that the Unites States will only cooperate
with those belief associations it considers harmless.72
B. What Is Cooperation?
While it is easy intuitively to understand what is meant by favoritism and
agnosticism, it is considerably harder to parse the terms cooperation, neutrality and
hostility. This sub-section strives to define the differences between cooperation
and neutrality (and between full cooperation and some intermediate type of
relationship, one that might be called benevolent neutrality). Simply put, a fully
cooperative government affords belief associations the right to take belief-
motivated action, supports belief associations, and offers belief associations
protection. A neutral government affords some individuals, but no associations,
the right to take belief-motivated action, does not support either individual
members of or belief associations as groups, and does not protect belief
associations.73 A benevolent neutral government74 affords members of belief
associations a thicker right to take belief-motivated actions than would a neutral
government, but otherwise differs little from that form.
69. Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 325 (1987) ("[The] concept [of
neutrality and a civil religion] appears to be ... irresistible.").
70. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 161-62.
72. The harm principle finds its first expression in JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 114-
41 (Currin V. Shields ed., 1956). Subsequent proponents include Marci A. Hamilton, Religious
Institutions, the No-Harm Doctrine, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU L. REv. 1099.
73. For more on this distinction from the European perspective, see MONSMA, supra note
54, at 165; Martin Heckel, The Impact of Religious Rules on Public Life in Germany, in WITTE, supra
note 4141, at 199. See also Robbers, supra note 49, at 61 ("Freedom of faith .... [includes] a negative
aspect, that is the right not to have and/or not to belong to a particular faith .... [but] also guarantees
the right to act according to one's beliefs.").
74. Chief Justice Burger coined this term in Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New
York. He said, "[s]hort of... expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints
productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship
and without interference." 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970). As Frederick Mark Geddes has explained,
"[b]enevolent neutrality is the doctrinal combination to which we would return if religious exemptions
were reinstituted without substantial change in establishment clause doctrine." An Unfirm Foundation:
The Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 555, 569 (1998).
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First, a cooperative government offers belief associations thick rights to opt-
out of generally applicable laws; that is what I mean when I say a cooperative
government permits belief-motivated action. For instance, in the Netherlands, the
government permits employees to rest on whatever their belief system designates
as holy days. 75  Likewise, the German Constitutional Court has explained,
"[r]eligious freedom [under the German Constitution] . .. encompasses not only
the (internal) freedom to believe or not to believe but also the individual's right to
align his behavior with the precepts of his faith and to act in accordance with his
internal convictions. 76 Indeed, that court has maintained that a husband may not
be prosecuted for neglect even when he refuses a life-saving blood transfusion for
his wife on religious grounds.77
Neutral governments guarantee no such right of action. In the United States,
for instance, the Constitution precludes the government from singling out
associations for ill treatment 78 and protects the rights of individuals to believe as
they wish, 79 but does not necessarily permit them, or those with whom they
associate, to opt-out of generally applicable laws.8 ° Indeed, as the Supreme Court
explained in Cantwell v. Connecticut, the Free Exercise Clause "embraces two
concepts-freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.",81 Finally, benevolent neutral governments
offer a moderate right of action. In Greece, for instance, although members of
belief associations may opt-out of some generally applicable laws, a Jehovah's
Witness was nevertheless sentenced to prison for proselytizing. The European
Court of Human Rights has summed up the attitude of benevolent neutral
governments by saying, "in democratic societies, in which several religion's coexist
within one and the same population, it may be necessary to place restrictions on
[the] freedom [of religion] in order to recognize the interests of the various
groups.''82
Second, cooperative governments support belief associations. In Germany,
for instance, the government helps churches collect membership dues. 8 3 Likewise,
75. Cf MONSMA, supra note 54, at 65.
76. Religious Oath Case (1972), 33 BverfGE 23, cited in Monsma, supra note 54, at 165
(emphasis added) see also Axel Frohr. von CAMPENHAUSEN, The German Headscarf Debate, 2004
BYU L. REV. 665, 677 ("Religious convictions that dictate one behavior as the correct way to cope
with circumstances are also protected by article 4.").
77. Edward J. Eberle, Free Exercise of Religion in Germany and the United States, 78 TUL.
L. REV. 1023, 1049 (2004).
78. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993)
79. Cf West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is
any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what
shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein.")
80. Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 921 (1990) (refusing to permit a Native
American Church an exemption from laws forbidding the consumption of peyote); see also Hamilton,
supra note 72, at 1101 ("When it comes to the public good, the rule of law needs to govern religious
institutions, just as it does other private entities.")
81. Cantwell v Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-304 (1940).
82. Kokkinakis v. Greece, Ser. A, no. 260-A, para. 33 (1993).
83. MONSMA, supra note 54, at 173.
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in the Netherlands, the government guarantees belief associations a certain amount
of media exposure.84 Both Germany and the Netherlands also permit and fund
dedicated schools run by belief associations." Neutral governments, on the other
hand, offer no such support. The United States forbids, for instance, the direct
provision of federal funds to parochial schools.
86
Finally, a cooperative government protects belief associations by offering
them a remedy when their beliefs are impugned. 87 As Gary Jacobsohn has said of
Israel, for instance, "the defense of the group against outrageous verbal assault can
readily be assimilated into an argument for individual liberty. '988  A neutral
government, on the other hand, affords no such remedy. 89
II. THE PRIVILEGE PARADIGM AND THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION
The model I have sketched of the set of possible relationships between
governments and belief associations suggests that one may disaggregate two
questions: the 'cooperation question' and the 'establishment question.' A
government may be agnostic yet cooperative, or it may have an established church
and remain hostile to other belief associations. From this model, my argument
proceeds in two steps. First, I consider what answers to the 'cooperation' and
'establishment' questions would best conduce to the construction of state and
nation in Iraq. I argue that cooperation is an engine that could drive Iraqi state-
and nation-building. I further argue that cooperation requires establishment, at
least in Iraq (and perhaps in other transitional Islamic states), and therefore that
establishment is a necessary prerequisite to the state- and nation-building project.
In brief, I maintain that the best way to build an Iraqi state and construct an Iraqi
nation is by adopting what I call a privilege paradigm-that is, by privileging both
non-dominant belief associations (cooperation) and the religion of the majority
(establishment). Second, I assess whether the Iraqi Constitution is congruent with
the theoretical ideals of the privilege paradigm and conclude that it is.
In making my argument for the privilege paradigm I echo Alexis de
Tocqueville 9° and James Madison. 91 De Tocqueville emphasized the importance
of civil associations, including and especially those I call belief associations, 9 2 to
84. Van Bijsterveld, supra note 50, at 220.
85. MONSMA, supra note 54, at 183 (discussing German schools); Van Bijsterveld, supra
note 50, at 219 ("Private schools are funded by the state under the condition that they meet certain
educational standards.").
86. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002) (noting that the Establishment
Clause forbids "government programs that provide aid directly to religious schools").
87. Maoz, supra note 42, at 360 (describing stringent Israeli penalties for racist or
religiously-inspired crimes).
88. GARY JEFFREY JACOBSOHN, APPLE OF GOLD: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISRAEL AND THE
UNITED STATES 227 (1993).
89. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a bias-motivated
crime law as content-based and inconsistent with the First Amendment).
90. 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY N AMERICA 106 (Henry Reeve trans.,
Vintage Classics 1990) (1835).
91. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,63 app. (1946).
92. Indeed, this is unsurprising, since "[rieligion is the leading force in American civil
society .. " Maddigan, supra note 66, at 316.
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the effective provision of state services and the construction of national identity.
As John 0. McGinnis has said, not only did de Tocqueville think that belief
associations "generate what modem sociologists would call social capital," but he
also believed that "civil associations have influence at the local level, making local
government more responsive and contributory to a more public-spirited
citizenry. 93 This is one of two important strands in my argument for the privilege
paradigm-that privileging, and cooperating with, belief associations will best
permit Iraq to create a state and forge a nation.
Madison saw "the establishment clause primarily as a means of...
encouraging a multiplicity of mutually balancing sects, all competing for adherents
and defining themselves in relation to each other, thus achieving a creative
equilibrium., 94 As Michael McConnell has said, with "[j]udicially enforceable
exemptions ... [a government can] ensure that unpopular or unfamiliar faiths will
receive the same consideration afforded mainstream or generally respected
religions ...., This is the second strand of my argument for the privilege
paradigm-that Iraq should afford each belief association thick and equal rights in
order to induce each to become more responsive to its constituents.
A. Cooperation, State Formation, and Nation Building
1. State Formation
To be legitimate, a state must provide certain services.96 As Max Weber has
put it, the state is an entity that monopolizes the use of force within its
boundaries. 97 Some argue that this is the state's only responsibility.98 Others, like
Michael Walzer, believe that the state must also provide medical and social
services. 99 Iraq seems likely to be the latter kind of state. Indeed, the Constitution
purports to establish a welfare state. 00 This sub-section assumes, therefore, that
state legitimacy in Iraq first requires the creation of a secure environment and
second, the provision of certain services (including health-care and social
services). In the words of a recent panel on UN reform, the latter is important to
state formation "not because [it is] intrinsically good but because [it is] necessary
to achieve the dignity, justice, worth and safety of ... citizens."10' These goals-
security and services-can best be achieved by the Iraqi government through
cooperation with belief associations.
93. John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The Rehnquist Court's
Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 491 (2002).
94. Mirsky, supra note 63, at 1239.
95. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1419-20 (1990).
96. Cf MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 84 ("[E]very political community attends
to the needs of its members as they collectively understand those needs.").
97. MAX WEBER, THEORY OF SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION (1947).
98. See generally ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
99. Cf WALZER, supra note 96, at 86-91 (discussing medical care and arguing that it
should be dispensed to all who need it).
100. See IRAQ CONST. art. 30.
101. United Nations, Report of the Secretary General's Panel on Threats, Challenges, and
Changes at 17 (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld/report2.pdf.
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First, as Noah Feldman has noted, the most "reliable guarantors of...
security [in Iraq are] associations forming around denominational identity."',0 2
Indeed, many prominent Iraqis rely on their co-religionists to keep them safe when
traveling about the country. 0 3 The way that Shi'a Ayatollah Ali Sistani was able
to rein in rebel leader Muqtada al-Sadr 0 4 suggests how important belief
associations may be to controlling Iraq.
Second, belief associations are effective purveyors of services. In the United
States, for instance, local associations provide many social services, and are often
more generous and effective than the federal government.'0 5 As one analyst has
put it, "[r]eligious charities are some of the most efficient social service providers,
as well as among the most successful, measured in terms of lives permanently
changed for the better."' 6 Therefore, there are strong practical reasons to permit
federal funding of religious belief associations.'0 7
The same is true elsewhere. In England "the church was the sole provider of
education or health care long before the state assumed these roles"10 8 ; and in
Germany, "[rireligious denomination[s] . . . have been a driving force for the
organization of social activities."' 1 9 As one prominent European commentator has
put it, "[w]ithout [religious] services, the guarantees of a social state .... [w]ould
be mere empty postulates."
''10
102. WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 78.
103. lyad Jamal Eddin, for instance, has "confirmed that the Shiite references are
independent from the state ... [and have] great weight ... in the Iraqi street." Al Hayat, Oct. 18, 2005,
available at http://www.almendhar.com/english_6984/news.aspx.
104. See WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 39 (describing Sistani's efforts to
marginalize al-Sadr as "a classic defense by institutional authority against incipient charismatic
appeal").
105. Peter J. Spiro, The Citizenship Dilemma, 51 STAN. L. REV. 597, 631 (1999) (book
review) ("In the U.S. context, a state may be more likely to establish generous benefits than would the
federal government, where those benefits will be enjoyed by established state residents, for they will
share the solidarities that come with living in the same limited space.").
106. Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental Cooperation with Faith-
Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 39 (1997).
107. Michael Walzer, Leary Lecture: Drawing the Line: Religion and Politics, 1999 UTAH
L. REV. 619,635-36. Cf Richard A. Epstein, Religious Liberty in the Welfare State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 375,382 (1990).
108. Rex Ahdar & Ian Leigh, Is Establishment Consistent with Religious Freedom?, 49
MCGILL L.J. 635, 647 (2004).
109. Van Bijsterveld, supra note 50, at 212.
110. Robbers, supra note 49, at 63.
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All this is doubly true throughout the Middle East."' Moreover, not only are
belief associations effective at ensuring the provision of basic services, but it was
Islamic constitutionalism, lobbied for by groups like the Muslim Brotherhood,"
2
that was the principal motive ideology behind and practical inspiration for the
establishment of the modem welfare states of the Middle East. That is, Islamic
constitutionalism has been a source of ideological justification. 1 3 Indeed, Islamic
law requires the community to provide sufficient levels of food, clothing and
housing for the poor; "every Muslim has the duty of zakat, to donate alms to the
poor."'"14  And Islamic constitutionalism has also been a source of procedural
inspiration. Classically, there were few procedural limits on secular law. For
instance, magistrates, those who dispensed secular law, were able to rely "on
intimidation and on circumstantial and hearsay evidence." ' 1 5  Procedure was a
matter of religious law. It has been at least in part by importing the procedures of
religious law that modem Middle Eastern welfare states have been able to
function.
Reaching out to religious communities, cooperating with them, will be
necessary if Iraq is to provide the basic services that are the prerequisites to state-
formation. Benevolent neutrality, or neutrality, would not likely be sufficient.
Simply affording individual members of belief associations thick rights to opt-out
of generally applicable laws would not foster the development of the partnerships
that the German government, for instance, enjoys.
2. Nation Building
A nation is an imagined community."l 6  Peter Schuck has suggested that
citizenship and nationality have four components: the political; the legal; the
psychological; and the sociological." 7 The political component "affirms the value
of public participation in the project of self-government."'' 8 The legal component
111. Cf Soli Ozel, Islam Takes a Democratic Turn, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at A27
(describing the victory of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey as "for the angry, downtrodden,
impoverished and excluded masses"); International Crisis Group, Islamic Social Welfare Activism in the
Occupied Palestinian Territories: A Legitimate Target?, at ii (2002) ("[S]uch institutions [belief
association in the Palestinian Territories] are more efficient than their secular or official counterparts,
delivering aid without distinction as to religious belief or political affiliation.").
112. L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 155
(2000) (Sayyid Qutb once said, "when there are those who cannot even find rags to cover their bodies,
it is an impossible luxury that a mosque should cost a hundred thousand guineas").
113. See, e.g., PATRICIA CRONE, GOD'S RULE: GOVERNMENT AND ISLAM 393 (2004) (citing
AI-Amiri for the proposition that "' [r]eligions are never established for private benefit or individual
advantage but always aim at collective welfare'). There is at least one significant counter-example.
The Iranian counter-revolution of 1907 led by Sheikh Fazlollah Nuri disputed, inter alia, the "use of
funds allocated to religious ceremonies for the purpose of building factories." SAID AMIR ARJOMAND,
THE TURBAN FOR THE CROWN: THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAN 51 (1990).
114. Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14 WIS.
INT'L L.J. 349, 371 (1996) [hereinafter Heroes or Heretics].
115. AL-MAWARDI, THE ORDINANCES OF GOVERNMENT 94 (Wafaa H. Wahba tr., 1996).
116. See generally BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM (Verso 2d ed. 1991).
117. Peter H. Schuck, Citizenship in Federal Systems, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 195, 207 (2000).
118. Id.
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"emphasizes the positive law that creates the distinctive status of citizen.""' 9 The
psychological component concerns "whether [citizens] conceive of themselves
primarily as members of a particular state rather than as members of some other
political community.' 120  Finally, the sociological component "looks to how
individual citizens are integrated into civil society."'12 1 Since the Constitution of
Iraq, like most constitutions, satisfies the requirements of the legal component,
122
and since I believe that the psychological and sociological components are
inextricably tied to each other, this sub-section presumes that nation formation has
two salient dimensions: the political/participatory; and the psycho-sociological.
The Political/Participatory Component
Citizens are likely to participate in national affairs when the government is
tolerant of opposing views, and when the government recognizes and affirms
group identities. When a government cooperates with belief associations, it
exhibits tolerance and becomes more tolerant; it also reinforces group identities.
When a government cooperates with belief associations, therefore, it stimulates
political participation.
A tolerant government willing to affirm group identities is likely to induce
participation. First, tolerance is good for participation. Many believe that
tolerance is the glue that holds a nation together. 123 Both Chandran Kukathas and
William Galston, for instance, argue that tolerance, rather than autonomy, is the
fundamental value of the liberal government. Chandran Kukathas says "toleration
is important, [as an independent value].' 24 Likewise, William Galston declares,
"properly understood, liberalism is about the protection of diversity, not the
valorization of choice.'
125
Second, affirming group identities is also good for participation. As George
Mead has noted, "one has to be a member of a community to be a self."' 126 Joseph
Raz concurs, "membership in [a] cultural group is a major determinant of [an
individual's] sense of who [she is]; it provides a strong focus of identification; it
contributes to what we have come to call [an individual's] sense of [her] own
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 208.
122. See IRAQ CONST. pmbl. ("We the sons of Mesopotamia . .
123. There are, of course, others who argue that the liberal states should not afford groups
qua groups rights. Emile Durkheim, Individualism and the Intellectuals, in ON MORALITY AND
SOCIETY (Robert N. Bellah ed., University of Chicago Press 1973). However, it is hard to see how a
state can avoid doing so, at least to some extent. See Naomi Mezey, The Common Place of Law Out of
the Ordinary: Law, Power, Culture, and the Commonplace, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 145, 152 (2001);
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Liberalism and Illiberalism: The Return of the Repressed: Illiberal Groups in
a Liberal State, 12 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897, 899 (2002) ("[The] reverse critique maintains that
the exercise of individual rights produces group rights.")
124. Chandran Kukathas, Cultural Toleration, in ETHNICITY AND GROUP RIGHTS 69, 79 (lan
Shapiro & Will Kymlicka eds., New York University Press 1997).
125. William A. Galston, Two Concepts ofLiberalism, 105 ETHICS 516, 523 (1995).
126. GEORGE H. MEAD, MIND, SELF, AND SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL
BEHAVIORIST 162 (Charles W. Morris ed., University of Chicago Press 1972).
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identity.' 27  Choices, and legal actions, are only meaningful when made or
rendered against a rich backdrop of intersubjective norms. 128 As one theoretician
has summarized, "[c]ultural freedom is . . . a precondition of liberal self-
invention.
' 129
But what is the link between cooperation and the establishment of a tolerant
government willing to affirm group identities? In fact, cooperation demonstrates,
entrenches, and begets tolerance. First, it is a visible sign that a government
welcomes dissent. To demonstrate that this is so, I will briefly compare Israel and
Turkey. Israel has a notoriously cooperative government (Israel plots as a
favoritism-cooperation regime); Turkey, on the other hand, has a notoriously
uncooperative government (Turkey plots as a favoritism-hostility regime). Gary
Jacobson has said of Israel, "ethnoreligious groups compete with the state for the
right to exercise coercive authority over individuals whom the group views as its
members and whom the state recognizes as citizens."'
30 By contrast, Ran Hirschl
has said of Turkey that courts found it "problematic that pro-hijab [pro-female-
head-covering] groups based their arguments on religious freedom grounds."''
Rather, "[t]he FP [had to] present[] the head scarf ban as a human rights violation
and a suppression of personal liberties, rather than as a matter 
of religion."'' 32
While members of belief associations have been able to dissent in cooperative
Israel, 133 it has been historically quite hard for them to do so in hostile Turkey. In
fact, Turkey routinely disbands political parties. 134 This has provoked widespread
disaffection. Indeed, an anti-secular, anti-government trend began in 1946 when
two "conservative deputies suggested th[e] reintroduction of religious education
into the public schools."'' 35 The trend grew stronger when Necmettin Erbakan left
the Justice Party in 1969 to found his own political party, and came to full national
127. Joseph Raz, Multiculturalism: A Liberal Perspective, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
178 (Clardendon Press rev. ed. 1995).
128. Free Speech and Community: Community and the First Amendment, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
473,475 (1997).
129. Eric J. Mitnick, Three Models of Group-Differentiated Rights, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L.
REV. 215, 234-35, 217 (2004); see Adeno Addis, Individualism, Communitarianism, and the Rights of
Ethnic Minorities, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 615, 643 (1992) ("The individualist claims that her
objective is to treat individuals equally, and that she does so by treating them as abstract individuals
rather than as members of a group. In reality, for members of minority ethnic groups, having equal
treatment turns out to be merely the right to be turned into some version of the members of the
dominant culture. One can treat individuals equally only if one is comparing them from a given point
of view. That point of view is not the abstract individual, for there is not such a creature, but rather the
individual who is located in and defined by the dominant culture and tradition.")
130. JACOBSOHN, supra note 88, at 27.
131. Ran Hirschl Constitutional Courts in the Field of Power Politics: Constitutional Courts
vs. Religious Fundamentalism: Three Middle Eastern Tales, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1819, 1850 (2004).
132. Nilufer Narli, The Rise of the Islamist Movement in Turkey, in REVOLUTIONARIES AND
REFORMERS: CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 132 (Barry Rubin ed., State
University of New York Press 2003) [hereinafter REVOLUTIONARIES].
133. Israel has, however, banned certain outrageous political parties (like the Kach Party).
134. See United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey, 1998 -I Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, available at
http://www.worldlii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/1998/I .html..
135. Susanna Dokupil, The Separation of Mosque and State: Islam and Democracy in
Modern Turkey, 105 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 72 (2002).
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flower when Turgut Ozal proclaimed "Turkish-Islamist Synthesis" in 1983.136 The
trend culminated with the recent election that brought the Justice and Development
Party to power. 137 As Hakan Yavuz puts it, Turkey's "uncritical modernization
ideology prevents open discussion that would lead to a new and inclusive social
contract that recognizes the cultural diversity of Turkey."'138 Cooperation therefore
performs a signaling function; it shows that a government welcomes dissent.
Not only is cooperation a signal, but it also may entrench tolerance, at least in
Iraq and the Middle East. Several of the most prominent liberal Islamists 139 rely on
notions of cooperation to buttress their theories. When a government cooperates, it
empowers liberal Islamists like them. When they are empowered, the government
is in turn more likely to remain cooperative. 140  Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi, 14 1
Abdol Karim Soroush, and Rachid Ghannouchi, for instance, require
cooperation. 142 Both Qaradawi and Soroush believe that strong opposition from
non-Muslim belief associations is necessary to progress. Qaradawi urges Islamic
states to use what he calls the "fiqh of balances" to answer knotty contemporary
questions-like whether one should assume public office in a corrupt state. 143 Fiqh
"is, to a large extent, a road map of what the law is, how it is to be applied, and
136. Ely Karmon, Radical Islamist Movements in Turkey, in REVOLUTIONARIES, supra note
132, at 46.
137. "[T]he intensity of secularization in Turkey implemented under Kemal Ataturk in the1930s and 1940s ultimately precipitated a fundamentalist response by various Islamist groups in that
country." Charles McDaniel, Islam and the Global Society: A Religious Approach to Modernity, 2003
BYU L. REV. 507, 522.
138. M. Hakan Yavuz, Cleansing Islam from the Public Sphere,
http://interact.sunnirazvi.org/forurnread.php? 14,1 165,1165 (last visited Nov. 14, 2005).
139. By "liberal Islamists" I mean Islamists who argue for democratic participation in the
government of their countries. I find some of the other positions taken by 'liberal Islamists' personally
and morally reprehensible. See infra note 141 (noting that Qaradawi, while an advocate of democracy,
has also supported bombing civilians in Israel).
140. AMR HAMZAWY, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE KEY TO
ARAB REFORM: MODERATE ISLAMISTS (2005), available at
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/pb4.hamzawy.FINAL.pdf, BASSMA KODMANI, CARNEGIE
ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE DANGERS OF POLITICAL EXCLUSION: EGYPT'S
ISLAMIST PROBLEM, available at http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/CP63.Kodmani.FINAL.pdf.
Crucial to the process of reclaiming a political space would be the
legalization of Islamic parties as a less dangerous alternative to the domination
by the supposedly apolitical religious establishment. A political party or
movement is a recognizable player. If it seeks to be legalized, it registers under a
name, has an address, publicizes the names of its leaders, and spells out its
agenda.
141. Qaradawi is a controversial figure. Cf AFTER JIHAD, supra note 23, at 64 ("Qaradawi
is a complex, problematic figure. He wrote an influential fatwa declaring Islam and democracy
compatible .... [he] was one of the first and most important Muslim clerics to condemn the killing of
civilians at the World Trade Center ... [b]ut Qaradawi also advises Hamas").
142. For an opposing liberal Islamist view, see Mohamed Talbi, Religious Liberty, in
LIBERAL ISLAM: A SOURCEBOOK 162 (Charles Kurzman ed., Oxford University Press 1998)("[R]eligious liberty is basically the right to decide for one's self, without any kind of pressure ... to
espouse the faith of one's choice.").
143. YUSUF QARADAWI, PRIORITIES OF THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT IN THE COMING PHASE 34
(1992).
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where necessary, how law can be discovered."' 44 But since the 'fiqh of balances,'
according to Qaradawi, is "a rather positivistic [fiqh based on the study of
contemporary reality,"'' 45 those who would use it need to be able to bounce their
ideas off those who disagree with them. 146  Indeed, Qaradawi explains
"[a]ppreciating the other view and respecting the opinions of those who adopt
contradictory attitudes," including on questions of religion, is a requirement for
those who would use thisfiqh.1
47
Likewise, Soroush believes that opposition is necessary to ensure that
religious knowledge itself continues to expand. He explains, "[i]n a religious
society, it is not religion per se that arbitrates, but some understanding of religion
which is, in turn, changing, rational, and in harmony with the consensual and
accepted extrareligious criteria." 148
Finally, Rachid Ghannouchi, unlike Qaradawi and Soroush who value
cooperation for second-order reasons, makes cooperation the centerpiece of his
theory of Islamic democracy. 149 He calls for "an Islamic system that features...
protection of minorities, equality of all secular and religious parties."'
50  A
government that embraces views like theirs is more likely to remain tolerant than
one that does not, and their views require cooperation.
Nor are Qaradawi, Soroush and Ghannouchi members of a lunatic fringe.
Within Islamic communities, the concept of shura (consultation) has been much
discussed in recent years. Muhammad Iqbal, for instance, has averred:
The transfer of the power of Ijtihad [interpretation] from individual
representatives of schools to a ... legislative assembly which, in view of
the growth of opposing sects, is the only form Ijma [or shura] can take
in modem times, will secure contributions to legal discussion from
laymen who happen to possess a keen insight into affairs.'
51
However, shura requires freedom of belief and of thought.1
52
Third and finally, cooperation begets tolerance. When there are more, and
144. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari'ah: Sources, Interpretation, and
Rule-making, I U.C.L.A. J. ISLAMIC &NEAR E. L. 135, 137 (2002).
145. QARADAWI, supra note 143.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. ABD AL-KARIM SURUSH, REASON, FREEDOM, AND DEMOCRACY IN ISLAM: ESSENTIAL
WRITINGS OF ABDOLKARIM SOROUSH 132 (Mahmoud Sadri & Ahmad Sadri eds. & trans., Oxford
University Press 2000).
149. Soli Ozel, Turkey at the Polls: After the Tsunami, in ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY IN THE
MIDDLE EAST 164 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., Johns Hopkins University Press 2003).
150. Id.
151. John L. Esposito & John 0. Voll, ISLAM AND DEMOCRACY 28 (Oxford University Press
1996) (emphasis added); see also Islamic Foundation, The Political Framework of Islam,
http://www.jamaat.org/islam/HumanRightsPolitical.html (Ahmed Said Khan & Khurshid Ahmad trans.)
(last visited June 15, 2003) (based on interview with Syed Abul A'la Maudoodi).
152. Ali R. Abootalebi, Islam, Islamists, and Democracy, 3 MIDDLE E. REV. INT'L AFF. J. 14,
17 (1999) ("An indispensable element in building such [an Islamic society] is freedom of thought and
expression, including freedom from govemment control and suppression."), available at,
http://meria.idc.ac.il/joumal/1999/issuel/abootalebi.pdf.
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more equal, belief associations, tolerance is more likely than when there is a
dominant belief association and only a handful of weak non-dominant belief
associations. In the United States, for example, the proliferation of religious sects
antedated the entrenchment of a culture of religious tolerance. As Noah Feldman
has argued, in nineteenth century America, when those who sought to teach
morality in public schools confronted the fact of religious heterogeneity, they
adopted non-sectarian curricula.153 Feldman explains:
[When] religious heterogeneity [arose alongside] the strong sense
among American elites . . . that education was necessary to produce
citizens capable of virtuous political action .. [and that] it must include
... moral virtues... the solution.., had to be a non-sectarian stance. 154
Indeed, it was only when Catholics grew sufficiently strong to challenge
Protestants that Protestants began aggressively to push for disestablishment. 5 5 To
take one famous example, Justice Douglas is said to have passed a note to Justice
Black that read "if the Catholics get public money to finance their religious
schools, we better insist on getting some good prayers in public schools or we
Protestants are out of business."' 15 6 What Justice Douglas meant was, the fact of
competition compelled Protestants to make one of two moves: either they had to
fight Catholics for believers, and establish more and more religious Protestant
schools, or both Catholics and Protestants had to agree to tone down the religious
rhetoric in public schools.
What this means for Iraq is that if the government cooperates with and affirms
belief associations, belief associations are likely to proliferate, and if such
associations proliferate, each will have to cooperate with the others, and the
government will become more tolerant. Belief associations that do not cooperate
and compete will become irrelevant in the court of public opinion. For instance,
radical Saudi ideologues have been the subject of ridicule because of theirfatwas
(religious decrees) banning soccer. 157 As Michael McConnell has summarized,
"protect[ing] the interests of religious minorities in conflict with the wider society.
encourages the proliferation of religious factions."'158
At this point, one might say, "stop, what about the Mormons and other
disfavored religious groups in the United States-wasn't polygamy outlawed, not
tolerated?" Indeed, in 1856, Republicans likened polygamy to slavery, calling
153. Symposium, Beyond Separatism: Church and State. Non-sectarianism Reconsidered,
18 J. L. & POLITICS 65, 71, 103 (2002).
154. Id.
155. For excellent discussion of this thesis, see Stephen M. Feldman, Religious Minorities
and the First Amendment: The History, the Doctrine, and the Future, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 222, 232(2003) [hereinafter Religious Minorities]. See also Thomas C. Berg, Anti-Catholicism and Modern
Church-State Relations, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 121, 123-51 (2001); John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan,
A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 297-305 (2001).
156. Religious Minorities, supra note 155, at 234.
157. See Geoff D. Porter, God Is in the Rules, N.Y. Times, Oct. 16, 2005 at 13. Cf
FRANKLIN FOER, How SOCCER EXPLAINS THE WORLD: AN UNLIKELY THEORY OF GLOBALIZATION
(Harper Collins 2004).
158. McConnell, supra note 95, at 1515.
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them "twin relics of barbarism."15 9  In Reynolds v. United States, the Supreme
Court upheld a law forbidding polygamy. 160 Yet the Mormon experience is not a
counter-example; rather, it reinforces my point. The Mormon Church resisted
these legal attacks. 161 Attempts to suppress Mormons and eradicate their faith
failed. Their continued vitality provoked some of their opponents to modulate
their views; they began to advocate the "strict separation of 
church and state."'162
Not only does cooperation demonstrate, entrench and beget tolerance, but it
also reinforces group identities. A cooperative government supports belief
associations, protects them, and affords them thick rights to opt-out of generally
applicable laws. Belief associations are stronger under cooperative governments
than under neutral governments, and members of such associations are therefore
more capable of political participation (inasmuch as they feel more secure).
Indeed, as Christopher Eisgruber has noted, "religion [and belief associations more
generally] [are] a source of especially virulent political factions . . .[and as such
are] a valuable haven for political and philosophical diversity.' 63
Some argue that cooperation discourages participation because it permits
legislators to adduce arguments that are not publicly accessible. The syllogism
that supports this argument goes as follows: if the government uses its power when
the use of that power cannot be justified by a reason that each citizen could
conceivably understand, it alienates some citizens64; a religious reason (or reason
provoked by belief of any kind) is a kind of reason that not all citizens can
understand165; therefore, cooperation fosters disaffection.
166 This argument goes
159. Kerry Abrams, Polygamy, Prostitution, and the Federalization of Immigration Law,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 641,659 (2005) (quoting SARAH BARRINGER GORDON, THE MORMON QUESTION:
POLYGAMY AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 55 (The University
of North Carolina Press 2002)).
160. 98 U.S. 145, 167-68 (1879); see also Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1, 46 (1890); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 347-48 (1890).
161. Nathan B. Oman, The Story of a Forgotten Battle: Reviewing The Mormon Question:
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth Century America, 2002 BYU L. REV. 745, 749
(2002) ("The Mormons responded [to persecution] by resisting.").
162. Sarah Barringer Gordon, 'Our National Hearthstone': Anti-Polygamy Fiction and the
Sentimental Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 295,
337(1996).
163. Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional
Order, 89 Nw. U.L. REV. 347, 349 (1995).
164. Cf. BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 103 (1980); JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 137 (1993) ("[O]ur exercise of political power is fully proper only
when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and
equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their
common human reason.").
165. Cf. Abner S. Greene, The Incommensurability of Religion, in LAW AND RELIGION 226,
234 (Stephen M. Feldman ed., 2000) ("[R]eligion often self-consciously revels in the insensible.").
Why this need be so is unclear. Cf William P. Marshall, The Other Side of Religion, in LAW AND
RELIGION, supra, (discussing the assumption that reason enjoys epistemological pride of place).
166. Robert Audi, The Place of Religious Argument in a Free and Democratic Society, in
LAW AND RELIGION, supra note 165, at 77 ("If I am coerced on grounds that cannot motivate me, as a
rational informed person, to do the thing in question, I cannot come to identify with the deed and will
tend to resent having to do it.").
2006
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
too far. 167  First, it is not clear that cooperation permits legislators to rely
exclusively on religious reasons (or reasons provoked by belief) in passing laws. 168
Second, it is not clear that religious discussion might not be the best way of
framing the argument for or against a certain law. For instance, Ayatollah Ali
Sistani's fatwa calling for elections was considerably more effective than lay
lobbying could have been at democracy promotion in Iraq. 169 Nevertheless, I agree
that cooperation has its disadvantages. It is insufficiently sensitive to the claims of
the lone dissenter; and it requires the government to make judgments about what
counts as 'belief.' Both of these disadvantages could curtail participation.
Cooperation does not protect the lone dissenter. In the United States, no child
need hear prayer in school. Under a cooperative government, on the other hand,
children may have to study morality in schools. 170  Likewise, pacifists may be
compelled to participate in celebrations of military victories. 17 1 To cap it all off,
the European Commission of Human Rights has held that a cooperative
government may tax even those who are not members of any belief association to
pay for the 'secular' services provided by a belief association. 172 This problem
has, however, less bite in Iraq than it might elsewhere. Since insecurity prompts
individuals to join together,' 73 there are few lone dissenters at large. 174
Cooperation also requires the government to determine what counts as
'belief.' In England, for instance, a court of appeals had to decide whether the
Church of Scientology was a 'church.' It found that it was not. 175 Likewise, in
167. See, e.g., Richard Albert, American Separationism and Liberal Democracy: The
Establishment Clause in Historical and Comparative Perspective, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 867, 870 (2005)("[lit cannot be the case that establishmentarianism is violative of liberal democracy even as we readily
count many western establishmentarian nations as liberal democracies. Of these two premises, one must
necessarily be untrue. It is the former.").
168. Cf KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 25 (1988)("[T]hough liberal democracy involves a limited commitment to publicly accessible reasons for
decision, it does not entail for the political realm either exclusive reliance on such reasons or an
unqualified acceptance of a narrow form of rationalism.").
169. See WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 40-41. Indeed, many prominent Islamist
reformers use religious reasons to endorse democracy. Abdullah an-Naim, for instance, advocates
revival of the doctrine of naskh. ABDUALLAHI AHMED AN-NA'IM, TOWARD AN ISLAMIC REFORMATION
34 (1990) ("[T]hat [principle] would permit applying some verses of Qur'an and accompanying Sunna
instead of others."). Moreover, Islamic reasons may be more accessible than reasons provoked by other
beliefs. Cf Khaled Abou El Fadl, Muslims and Accessible Jurisprudence in Liberal Democracies: A
Response to Edward B. Foley's Jurisprudence and Theology, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 1227, 1229-30
(1998) ("[T]he internal dynamics of Islamic law affirm the principle of accessibility [of reasons]. There
is no formal church in Islam. Furthermore, no single institution can define the correct view in Islamic
law.").
170. Bernard and others v. Luxembourg, No. 17187/90, 75 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
57(1993).
171. Cf. Valsamis v. Greece, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 72.
172. Brett G. Scharffs, The Autonomy of Church and State, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1217, 1262
(2004).
173. NOZICK, supra note 98, at 12 ("Groups of individuals may form mutual-protection
associations.").
174. Cf WHAT WE OWE IRAQ, supra note 11, at 78-79.
175. See R v. Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 Q.B. 697; see also McClean,
supra note 43, at 313; Peter Cumper, Religious Liberty in the United Kingdom, in WITTE, supra note
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Israel the Supreme Court struck down an organizational challenge to a budget
allocation because it found that the plaintiff organization (claiming it had not
received it fair share of 'Haredi ' 176 money) was not Haredi. 177  Such disparate
treatment has been upheld by the European Commission of Human Rights. 78 This
is not, however, an intractable problem. As one commentator has put it, "[t]he
case of the Church of Scientology in Sweden illustrates that there are possibilities
for overcoming traditional inequalities in the treatment of new or minority
religious communities." 179 Indeed, these two disadvantages, especially in the Iraqi
context, are outweighed by the advantages of cooperation.
The Psycho-Sociological Dimension
Citizenship is meaningful only if it "formaliz[es] an emotional attachment to... [a
country and] to its other citizens."' 180  Citizenship is at once a good that is
distributed to particular individuals' and the glue that holds a nation together.
82
As T. Alexander Aleinikoff has put the latter point, "[w]ithout a notion of
citizenship, sovereignty has no home."'183 In the United States, some have argued
that working with belief associations may be the only way for the government to
stem the tide of "individualism in American life and [frustrate] its continuing
potential to threaten other important democratic values."'184 Others have suggested
that our democratic system of government requires a kind of semi-devotional
commitment to our Constitution.' 85 Certainly, in Iraq, if the government were to
cooperate with belief associations, citizens would find at once that peculiar
benefits inured to them by virtue of their citizenship and that they would have
more in common with other citizens than they had thought.
When it is an incident to the distribution of useful goods, citizenship is
valued. This is, of course, a truism. But in Iraq, and elsewhere in the Middle East
41, at 220 ("The granting of tax exemption to religions ... has been accompanied by detailed
discussion of what actually constitutes a religion .... ).
176. Haredi describes any one of several sects of Judaism.
177. Shetreet, supra note 42, at 444.
178. See Scharffs, supra note 172, at 1266.
179. Thilo Marauhn, Status, Rights and Obligations of Religious Communities in a Human
Rights Context: A European Perspective, 34 ISR. L. REV. 600, 631 (2000) (the Church of Scientology
was recognized by Sweden after a series of constitutional and legislative changes that separated the
Church of Sweden from the state). Likewise, in Spain, a court struck down an attempt by the
government to impose stringent registration requirements on New Religious Movements (NRMs).
Augustin Motilla, Religious Pluralism in Spain: Striking the Balance Between Religious Freedom and
Constitutional Rights 2004 BYU L. REV. 575, 589-90 (2004).
180. Stephen H. Legomsky, Why Citizenship?, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 279, 291 (1994).
181. See generally Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of
American Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGRATION L.J. 1 (1989).
182. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Community, Citizenship, and the Search for National
Identity, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1504, 1504-05 (1986); Michael Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in
BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 1-35 (P. Brown & H. Shue eds., 1981).
183. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens, Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST.
COMMENTARY 9, 14 (1990).
184. Maddigan, supra note 66, at 311.
185. Sanford Levinson, Pledging Faith in the Civil Religion; Or, Would You Sign the
Constitution?, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 113, 119 (1987).
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where goods are scarce,1 86 if membership in a national community offers an
economic leg up, it will be much in demand. Indeed, when "[c]onfronted with a
feeling of impotence against dire economic and social forces, patronage allows
even the lowliest individual the possibility to survive and the recourse to be
heard." 187  But how and why does cooperation make citizenship a conduit for
economic goods? In fact, cooperation encourages the development of local
industries and sub-state groups, which are necessary to the creation of social
capital and to economic advances. 188  Robert Putnam has demonstrated,
commercial development and the existence of trusting and vibrant sub-
communities are inextricably linked. 8 9 And at a broader level Marcus Noland has
found, despite critics' assertions to the contrary, "[i]f anything, Islam promotes
growth."' 90 Under a cooperative government, therefore, individual members of
belief associations are likely to value citizenship more than they would under a
neutral government; as members of belief associations, they will be able to lay
better claim to shares of the growing pie.
Second, cooperation is congenial to Islam. Since the overwhelming majority
of Iraqis are Muslims, if the state is cooperative, rather than neutral, they are more
likely to see it as friend rather than foe. Islam has historically been, and remains, a
communitarian religion. 191 A cooperative government values belief associations
qua belief associations; a cooperative government is communitarian. A neutral
government values belief associations only insofar as citizens value them; it, unlike
a cooperative government, is individualistic.
Medieval Muslim religious thinkers, whether philosophers or jurists, have
described Islam as a set of principles that, if followed, would permit a community
to create the City of God on Earth. Al-Farabi, for instance, said, "there may be a
number of virtuous nations and virtuous cities whose religions are different, even
186. Cf Timur Kuran, The Absence of the Corporation in Islamic Law: Origins and
Persistence (2005) (USC Law and Economics Paper No. 04-21; USC CLEO Research Paper No. C04-
16), at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstractid=585687.
187. HISHAM SHARABI, NEOPATRIARCHY: A THEORY OF DISTORTED CHANGE IN ARAB
SOCIETY 21, 46 (1988).
188. lan Ayres & Jonathan R. Macey, Institutional and Evolutionary Failure and Economic
Development in the Middle East, 30 YALE. J. INT'L. L. 397 (2005).
189. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING DEMOCRACY WORK: CIvIc TRADITIONS IN MODERN
ITALY 167-71 (1993); see also Marcus Noland, Religion, Culture, and Economic Performance 1 (2003)
(KDI Working Paper Series, Working Paper 03-13) (unpublished, on file with the author, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=497702) ("[S]ects ... provide for extra-legal means of establishing trust and
sanctioning miscreants in intragroup transactions,... reducing uncertainty and improving efficiency...
"1)
190. Noland, supra note 189, at 7.
191. See JOHN L. ESPOSITO, WOMEN IN MUSLIM FAMILY LAW 1 (1982) ("The Islamic
community (ummah) is to be the dynamic vehicle for the realization of the divine pattern."); Ira M.
Lapidus, State and Religion in Islamic Societies, 151 PAST AND PRESENT 3, 9 (1996) ("No distinction
was made between the realm of religion and that of the state."); Jason Morgan-Foster, Third Generation
Rights: What Islamic Law Can Teach the International Human Rights Movement, 89 YALE H.R. &
DEV. L.J. 67, 82 (2005) ("Social virtue [in Islamic societies] is preeminently collective rather than inter-
individual."); David A. Westbrook, Islamic International Law and Public International Law: Separate
Expressions of World Order, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 819, 823 (1993) ("Sovereignty is divine, and therefore
the will of God, even regarding daily matters").
VOL. 34:2
MOSQUE AND STATE IN IRAQ'S NEW CONSTITUTION
though they. all pursue the very same kind of happiness. For religion is but the
impressions of these things or the impressions of their images, imprinted in the
soul.' 192  Likewise, AI-Ghazali, although he condemned philosophy for
"abandoning the [traditional] imitation of what is true by embarking on the
imitation of the false,"'193 urged that religion inform government. That neither
philosophers nor jurists questioned the community's need for a religious leader is
telling; as Patricia Crone has summarized:
[T]here were three views on what would happen to the community if
there ceased to be an imam [a religious leader]. The first was that it
would cease to exist altogether .. .The second position was that a
community without an imam ... would lose its public sphere .... The
third view was that the community would continue to exist... because
the imam's functions... would devolve to [other religious scholars].1
94
If religion were a personal matter, neither a religious leader nor religious scholars
would be necessary.
Modem Muslim thinkers hold similar views. Article X of the Universal
Islamic Declaration of Human Rights declares, "The Quranic principle 'There is no
compulsion in religion' shall govern the religious rights of non-Muslim countries.
In a Muslim country, religious minorities shall have the choice to be governed in
respect of their civil and personal matters by Islamic Law or by their own laws."'
19 5
Indeed, as one commentator has explained, "[m]odern Muslim writings on
pluralism .. .particularly stress that pluralism in Islam is conceived within a
framework of unity .... [This] reflects the distinctive attitude of these Muslim
thinkers toward prioritizing society over the individual."'
196
3. Does Cooperation Require Establishment?
I have argued up to this point that the ethics and pragmatics of state and
192. AI-Farabi, The Political Regime (Fauzi M. Najjar, tr.), in MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY: A SOURCEBOOK 31, 41 (Ralph Lemer & Muhsin Mahdi eds., 1972) [hereinafter
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY].
193. AL-GHAZALI, THE INCOHERENCE OF THE PHILOSOPHERS 2 (Michael E. Marmura tr.,
2002).
194. CRONE, supra note 113, at 242-43.
195. Arzt, supra note 53, at 142.
196. Muhammad Khalid Masud, The Scope of Pluralism in Islamic Moral Traditions, in
ISLAMIC POLITICAL ETHICS 135 (Sohail H. Hashmi ed., 2002) (emphasis added); see MOHAMMAD
HASHIM KAMALI, FREEDOM, EQUALITY AND JUSTICE IN ISLAM 8 (Islamic Texts Soc'y 2002) (1999)
("Freedom in Islam finds its meaning in 'belonging to the community and participating with the
people."'). Indeed, this sentiment is at the root of Muslim attitudes toward apostasy. Abu aI-A'la
Mawdudi, a contemporary Islamist, expressed a common attitude when he said, "opposition of different
political parties is ruled out [because] ... [i]n a properly constituted Islamic state, interests and needs
are reconciled." L. CARL BROWN, RELIGION AND STATE: THE MUSLIM APPROACH TO POLITICS 153
(2000). See, e.g., Avempace, The Governance of the Solitary (Lawrence Berman tr.), in MEDIEVAL
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY, supra note 192, at 127 ("[l]t is, then, evident that every opinion arising in the
perfect city [the City of God] that is different from the opinions of its citizens is false .... ); see also
AHMAD S. MOUSSALLI, THE ISLAMIC QUEST FOR DEMOCRACY, PLURALISM, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 6
(2001) ("[A]postasy is distinguished from freedom of (un)belief, since it also implies treason against an
Islamic state.").
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nation building mean the Iraqi government should cooperate with belief
associations. I do not mean to suggest, however, that the ethics and pragmatics of
state- and nation-building require as afirst order matter the establishment of Islam
in Iraq. Yet, in this sub-section I explain that in order for cooperation to stand a
chance, Iraq should establish Islam; establishment is required because it is a
prerequisite to cooperation.197
Indeed, it seems ironic but is probably true that the establishment of Islam as
the religion of the government in Iraq would conduce to cooperation with other
belief associations. 198  When a state has a substantial Christian population, a
government may be agnostic yet cooperative. Because Christianity conceives of
the aims of church and state as distinct-"[t]he aim and function of the secular law
is to secure outward peace and earthly welfare, whereas the law of the churches
serves the preaching of the word of God"199-cooperation often entails separation
of church and government. As one scholar has argued, Christianity makes "claims
of absoluteness" that are "incompatible with and opposed to their integration into
any secular concept. ... 200 However, when a country has a substantial Muslim
population, a government will find it much harder to be agnostic yet cooperative.
Islam is a communitarian religion that purports to govern everyday affairs.
Cooperation with Muslim belief associations requires integration, not separation.
20 1
Moreover, the establishment of Islam as the religion of the government may
conduce to its moderation, permitting greater cooperation. As one journalist has
reported, those clerics who have involved themselves in the drafting of the
Constitution, and who might participate in the subsequent government of Iraq
(including even firebrands like Muqtada al-Sadr), have "compromise[d] their
vision. 2 °2 In England, for instance, Parliament may reject measures passed by the
clerical Synod,20 3 and the Queen has the power to appoint some high church
officials. The same could become true in Iraq. Indeed, Ahmad Moussalli, a
197. 1 do not bear a brief in this article for any particular form of establishment. See supra
notes 42-50 and accompanying text (discussing different forms of establishment). Certainly, I do not
mean to suggest, to give but one example, that all government employees in Iraq should be Muslim.
Rather, I mean only to argue that Iraq should favor Islam over other religions in some limited respects.
198. This is somewhat counterintuitive. Some have argued that establishment and
cooperation are incompatible. Cf Cumper, supra note 172, at 228 (discussing the treatment of Sikhs in
the United Kingdom). Blasphemy laws in the U.K., for instance, protect only Christianity. Arzt, supra
note 53, at 117 ("Blasphemy is generally defined as denial of the truth of Christian doctrine or the
Bible, using words which are 'scurrilous, abusive or offensive to vilify the Christian religion."'); Haim
H. Cohn, The Law of Religious Dissidents: A Comparative Historical Survey, 34 ISR. L. REV. 39, 91
(2000) ("[Tlhe attack on Christianity or the Scriptures must be calculated to outrage the feelings of the
general body of the community."). Yet establishment and cooperation are compatible. Israel serves as
an excellent example of this truth. Maoz, supra note 42, at 359 (discussing the penalties imposed on
those who malign any belief association).
199. Heckel, supra note 73, at 192 (italics omitted).
200. Id. at 197 (emphasis added). Such is reflected in the biblical aphorism "[g]ive to
Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's." Mark 12:17.
201. As Garlicki has said, "Islam, from its very origins, has been aligned with the state...
Garlicki, supra note 28, at 468.
202. Tavemise & Wong, supra note 6.
203. McClean, supra note 43, at 312.
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prominent Muslim theorist, argues:
[W]hen... religious views are projected as political matters, then there
is a possibility for compromise . . . [f]or . . . politics is the art of the
possible . . . . For instance, when Mu'awiya and Ali looked at their
differences as political in nature, it was possible to find a
compromise.
204
Finally, the establishment of Islam as the religion of the government may be
conducive to the production of negative constitutional culture, also a necessary
prerequisite to effective cooperation. A constitution may be written for many
reasons, not only in an effort to restrict the ability of government to act in certain
ways. For instance, Nathan Brown has argued that many Middle Eastern
constitutions are intended to serve as affirmative grants of power, not restrictive
205limits on government. Yet the Constitution of Iraq should limit the power of the
government if cooperation is to succeed. This idea of limiting the power of
government is what I call negative constitutionalism. And in the Middle East,
negative constitutionalism derives from Islam.
Indeed, medieval Muslim philosophers believed that religion limited the
power of the king. Either the Philosopher King could be trusted to limit his own
power-because of his proximity to the Active Intellect 206 --or religious law would
limit it for him.207 Other early Muslim thinkers articulated a contractarian view of
government. Ibn Khaldun, for instance, distinguished religious law from secular
law by arguing that the former was a chosen restraint and therefore compatible
with assabiyya (communal solidarity). "When the Muslims got their religion from
the Lawgiver (Muhammad), the restraining influence came from themselves."2 °8
Assabiyya, was "the restraining influence that had been Islam., 20 9 When secular
law was imposed unilaterally and, subverting assabiyya, "[came from] the sword"
dynasties began to fall. 2'0 For such thinkers, if the government did not live up to
211its promises, the people had the right to rescind their offer to participate.
Secular law, because it was not contractarian and did not afford the dissatisfied a
right to revoke, was unacceptable; religious law, on the other hand, was endorsed.
204. MOUSSALLI, supra note 196, at 159.
205. BROWN, supra note 25, at 92 (asserting that "[t]he final motivation adduced for issuing
constitutional texts in the absence of constitutionalist intentions was the desire to organize or augment
state authority"). Cf Stephen Holmes, Precommittment and the Paradox of Democracy, in
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 196 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds., 1988) (noting that
constitutions do not "merely hobble majorities and officials .... [they] also assign[] powers").
206. Al-Farabi, supra note 192, at 37 (explaining, for instance, that only "if it does not
happen that a man exists with [the appropriate] qualifications .... [should one] adopt the Laws
prescribed by the earlier [Kings]").
207. CRONE, supra note 113, at 263 (summarizing that "God was the ... source of
legal/moral obligations").
208. IBN KHALD-UN, THE MUQADDIMAH: AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY 260 (N. J.
Dawood ed. & Franz Rosenthal trans. 1969) (emphasis added).
209. Id. at 427.
210. Id.
211. Cf NIZAM AL-MULK, THE BOOK OF GOVERNMENT; OR, RULES FOR KINGS 24 ff.
(Hubert Darke trans. 1960).
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Finally, for a third set of early thinkers, the interpretation of religious law was a
task the executive should not and could not shoulder. During the ninth century, the
Caliph al-Ma'mun sought to persuade the Muslim community of the 'createdness'
of the Qu'ran.212 Many jurists resisted. Although the Caliph persecuted those who
refused to accept his interpretation of the Qu'ran, the jurists won out in the end.213
Islam entitled them to hold their own opinions.
However conceived, therefore, whether as an immanent, contractarian, or
jurisdictional limit on government, negative constitutionalism in the Middle East
derives from Islam and Islamic thought. Moreover, such is still the state of affairs
today. For all its faults, the Saudi Arabian monarch is genuinely constrained,214 in
part because the Saudi Basic Law enshrines Islamic law,215 whereas the Moroccan
King is not, in part because the Constitution of Morocco does not.216
B. The New Iraqi Constitution: An Assessment
The new Iraqi Constitution (in its treatment of religion) is congruent with the
privilege paradigm in that it has the potential to facilitate state and nation
construction. First, it ensures that Iraq will cooperate with non-dominant belief
associations. It does so by explicitly extending its protection to all religious
believers, including "Christians, Yazidis, [and] Sabaean Mandeans, 2 17  by
forbidding the establishment of parties that advocate takfir (the practice of
declaring someone an infidel), 218 and by ensuring that believers are free not only to
assert but also to practice their faiths. 219 Like that most cooperative of countries,
the Netherlands, the Iraqi Constitution permits not only Muslims but also
Christians to leave work on their holy days.220 It explicitly affirms that members
of belief associations are entitled to form legally recognized groups to advance
their goals 221 (and notes that Iraq is "keen to strengthen the role of civil society
groups" 22 2). The Iraqi Constitution uses the Arabic word mumarisa - meaning
212. See generally Hayrettin Yucesoy, Between Nationalism and the Social Sciences: An
Examination of Modern Scholarship on the 'Abbasid Civil War and the Reign of al-Ma'mun, 8
MEDIEVAL ENCOUNTERS 56, 62-65 (2002) (discussing the source, development, and role of the doctrine
of the createdness of the Qur'an).
213. See generally Lapidus, supra note 191, at 6-7.
214. Abdulaziz H. Al Fahad, Ornamental Constitutionalism: The Saudi Basic Law of
Governance, 30 YALE J. INT'L L 375 (2005). ("[T]he [Saudi] Basic Law treats the king as neither
sacrosanct nor an interpreter of Islam.").
215. See Ann Elizabeth Mayer, Conundrums in Constitutionalism: Islamic Monarchies in an
Era of Transition, 1 UCLA J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 183, 192-93 (2002) (highlighting that while the
Shari'a is the Constitution, the Basic Law is merely a nizam asasi (basic regulation)).
216. Mayer, supra note 215, at 208 (describing draftsmanship of the Saudi Basic Law as
"amateurish, muddled" and praising the "clarity" of the Moroccan Constitution).
217. See IRAQ CONST. art. 2(2).
218. Id. at art. 7(1).
219. Id. at art. 10 (holding that "[Ihe. state is committed to maintain and protect their sanctity
and ensure the exercising of (religious) rites freely in them"); id. at art. 40(1 )(a) (recognizing that "[t]he
followers of every religion and sect are free in: the practice of their religious rites, including the (Shiite)
Husseiniya Rites").
220. Cf id. at art. 12(2) (declaring that "official holidays... shall be fixed by law").
221. Id. at art. 40(l)(b).
222. Id. at art. 43(1).
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'practicing' (as in a profession) - in describing the freedoms afforded belief
223
associations.
The words used and promises made in the Iraqi Constitution are significant.
The constitutions of many predominantly Muslim countries do not permit members
of belief associations to perform their 'rites' ;224 and some restrict the freedoms of
religion to members of particular sects.225 For instance, in Brunei "[n]o person
shall be appointed to be Prime Minister ... [unless he] belong[s] to the [Shafeite]
sect., 22 6 Even the Afghan Constitution, promulgated recently with U.S. assistance,
permits ordinary legislation to override religious rights.227  This the Iraqi
Constitution explicitly forbids.
Second, the Constitution's articulation of the place of Islam in Iraq is
conducive to the moderation of Islam and the creation of a negative constitutional
culture (two of the three goals that establishment of Islam might achieve). The
Constitution reads, "[n]o law can be passed that contradicts the undisputed rules of
Islam. ' ,228 The words used for "undisputed rules" are thawabit ahkam. These
words mean something like the "fixed stars as adjudged." By using a derivative of
hakama, the root of the Arabic word for government, the Constitution may suggest
that the meaning of 'Islam' is for the people and their representatives, not the
clerics, to define.229 Indeed, unlike the Afghan Constitution, which requires jurists
to adhere to the "provisions" of Islam, the Iraqi Constitution seems to contemplate
popular involvement in the interpretation of Islam. 230 That religious leaders will
have to enter politics is triply assured-not only by the use of the words thawabit
ahkam but also by the number of legal questions the Constitution reserves for
resolution by subsequent legislation 231 and by the spur to populism offered in
223. Cf NATHAN J. BROWN, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE, THE
FINAL DRAFT OF THE IRAQI CONSTITUTION: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 5 (2005), available at
http://www.camegieendowment.org/files/FinalDraftSeptI6.pdf [hereinafter ANALYSIS AND
COMMENTARY] (underscoring that "[tihe Iraqi Constitution phrases religious rights in communal rather
than individual terms").
224. See, e.g., MOROCCO CONST. art. 6, available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
225. See, e.g., IRAN CONST. ch. 1, art. 13. (holding that "Zoroastrian, Jewish, and Christian
Iranians are the only recognized religious minorities"), available at http://confinder.richmond.edu.
226. BRUNEI CONST. art. 4(5).
227. AFG. CONST. ch. I, art. 2, available at
http://arabic.cnn.com/afghanistan/ConstitutionAfghanistan.pdf.
228. IRAQ CONST.art. 2(l)(a).
229. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 3 (asserting that this formula "[t]he
primary [interpretive] burden ... on the parliament"). Some have argued, on the other hand, that the
phrase thawabit ahkam, implies that a decision by a judge (huqm) would prevail were it to conflict with
will of parliament. Mark Levine, And the Winner Is ... The United States?, THE HUFFINGTON POST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-levine/iraqs-constitution-and-_b_6471 .html.
230. See AFG. CONST. art. 3; see also Hamida Ghafour, Afghanistan Gets New Name and a
Constitution, Jan. 6, 2004 (noting that no law under the Constitution can contradict Islamic beliefs),
available at http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/01/05/l073267970952.html. Of course, choosing the
wrong man or woman to serve as Chief Justice of the Iraqi Supreme Court would render this distinction
moot. Cf Alex Spillius, Afghans to Carry On Stoning Criminals, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Jan. 25,
2002 (discussing statements by the Afghan Chief Justice that stoning will continue in order to combat
crime).
231. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224, at 5 (pointing out that significant
details needed to define and protect rights have not been addressed in the Constitution, but are reserved
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Article 5.232 Moreover, when religious leaders have to take account of politics and
popular sentiment, as Ali and Mu'awiya did, their views moderate. Indeed, as
several prominent legal theorists have argued, when a legislature and a court are in
dialogue about the content of constitutional rights, those rights are likely to be
interpreted broadly, 233 and both the legislature and the court are likely to be
responsive to popular sentiment.234
Moreover, the Constitution affirms, "[n]o law can be passed that contradicts
the principles of democracy. 235 It thereby hints at the powerful role Islam and its
principles can play in checking executive and legislative power. As in Saudi
Arabia, where the religion clauses of the Basic Law are the only limits on the
monarch's power, in Iraq, those provisions of the new Constitution that deal with
religion ensure that no leader may rule by fiat.
III. THE PROTECTION PARADIGM
A. The Feminist Critique
The argument I elucidated in Parts I and II, like the Iraqi Constitution, is
subject to criticism. When the government cooperates with belief associations it
empowers the leaders of those associations. Many such associations, however,
subordinate women. In Pakistan, for instance, some families in remote areas have
been known to kill women that have "dishonored them."236 Likewise, under the
Pashtunwali, the tribal code of some Afghans, when one group needs to make
for parliamentary legislation). E.g. IRAQ CONST.art. 4(2) (noting that "[T]he scope of the phrase
'official language' and the manner of implementing the rules of this article will be defined by ... law..
."1).
232. IRAQ CONST. art. 5 ("The law is sovereign, the people are the source of authority and its
legitimacy").
233. Indeed, by using a word that connotes indisputability (thawabit), the Constitution
suggests that laws may only be stricken when their interference with Islam is crystal clear. See, e.g.
infra note 307 (highlighting that Egypt's Supreme Court generally strikes down laws only when there is
clear interference with Islam's fundamental principles and that the Court has tentatively forwareded
liberalism and democracy). But see Mark Levine, And the Winner Is . . . The United States?, THE
HUFFINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2005, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/mark-levine/iraqs-constitution-and-
_b_6471.html.
(suggesting that thawabit ahkam would include morality rules like those in force in Iran). This
interpretation seems implausible because the prior version of the clause used the words mujmuaa aleihi
to describe the rules the Iraqi framers considered 'fixed.' Mujmuaa is a derivative of the word jamaa,
which in turn is a term-of-art in Islamic law that connotes popular participation.
234. See, e.g., Larry D. Kramer, Popular Constitutionalism, circa 2004, 92 CAL. L. REv.
959, 982-83 (2004); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1950,
1983, 2003 (2003). Cf City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1997) (striking down the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act on the logic that "Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by
changing what the right is"). See generally Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on
the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 410 (1993) (providing a more precise
explanation of why coordinate construction - dialogue between Congress and the courts - has permitted
the elaboration of expansive individual rights).
235. IRAQ CONST. art. 2(I)(b).
236. Rachel A. Ruane, Comment, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women
in Jordan and Pakistan 14 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 1523, 1534-60 (2000)
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restitution to another it may supply them with virgin women.2 37 Finally, even in
Europe churches are able to impose loyalty tests on their employees and affiliates.
In Germany, where churches employ 600,000 people,238 each employee is subject
to dangerous ideological control. 239  The potential for oppression of women is
therefore deepened when the government permits associations to promulgate their
own personal status laws. Cooperation might also be a problem. As Susan Moller
Okin argues, women might be better off if the power of belief associations were
diminished.24 ° If there is no response to this feminist critique then perhaps the
United States cannot and should not endorse either cooperation or establishment.
If women are oppressed, neither a state nor a nation will likely be built in Iraq.
In this Part, I articulate what I call the protection paradigm. The protection
paradigm is a necessary corollary to the privilege paradigm. The protection
paradigm imposes three requirements on government, each intended to ensure that
women, or other members of groups subject to oppression, are able to express
dissent or dissatisfaction from within belief associations. The protection paradigm
flows from the duty Feldman suggests the United States should undertake and that
I have argued the United States must undertake. For the Iraqi government to
establish a state and build a nation, it should adopt not only the privilege paradigm
but also the protection paradigm.
The first requirement of the protection paradigm is that Iraq should adopt a
jurisdictional arrangement that ensures local Muslim courts will have to compete
with national secular courts for business. The second requirement is that Iraq
should offer financial support to those members of belief associations who wish to
express disfavored opinions-e.g. the orthodox Muslim women who want to
explain why the Qu'ran forbids polygamy. Finally, the third requirement is that
the Iraqis should either force each school to offer a modem civics class or establish
a uniform curriculum. Both the civics class and the uniform curriculum are
designed to ensure that all students are willing and able to question the beliefs of
their parents. Before launching into a detailed description of the protection
paradigm, however, I will explain why other responses to the feminist critique are
unsatisfactory.24'
B. Responses to the Feminist Critique
237. Mark A Drumbl, Rights, Culture, and Crime: The Role of Rule of Law for the Women
of Afghanistan, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 349, 384-85 (2004). See generally Niloufer Qasim Mahdi,
Pukhtunwali: Ostracism and Honor Among the Pathan Hill Tribes, 7 ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY
295-304 (1986) (discussing the functions of ostracism and honor in Pathan society), available at
http://www.bepress.com/context/gruterclassics/article/1036/viewcontent.
238. Robbers, note 49, at 66.
239. Id. at 67 (describing a Federal Constitutional Court decision upholding termination of a
physician employed at a Catholic hospital who publicly supported abortion); Van Bijsterveld, supra
note 50, 219 (noting that the same is true of the Netherlands, where religious schools may impose
loyalty conditions on their staff).
240. Susan Moller Okin, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in Is MULTICULTURALISM
BAD FOR WOMEN? 22-23 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999).
241. For an excellent recent discussion of the difficulty in responding to the feminist critique
in a developing country, see Pratibha Jain, Balancing Minority Rights and Gender Justice, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 201 (2005).
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Feminists are reluctant to embrace Okin's view.242 Understandably, they may
not want to embrace what Iris Marion Young calls a "progressively individualistic
social ontology. 243  Therefore, they seek compromise. Some feminists believe
that the autonomy of belief associations should be contingent upon observation of
universal rights norms.24 4 Others distinguish between the relationship of a belief
association to the state and to its members; they demand that belief associations be
protected against the state while members be protected against the association.245
Finally, yet others suggest that government should permit belief associations a
margin of appreciation246 in dealing with its members.247 This section analyzes
these responses to the feminist critiques and finds them lacking.
The first two suggestions-what one might call the universal liberal and the
autonomy approaches-are untenable. The universal liberal approach, and by this
I mean any attempt to condition group recognition on the ability and desire of the
group to respect liberal principles, 248 is imperialistic 249 and orientalist.250 As Rama
Mani has said, "[i]f ideas and institutions about as fundamental and personal a
value as justice are imposed from the outside without an internal resonance, they
may flounder, notwithstanding their assertions of universality. 251  Indeed, one
candidate who stood in the January Iraqi election powerfully remarked, "[i]f I
believe my right is to wear this black robe and you ban it, then my right has been
242. In fact, some argue that these are 'unavoidable costs' of multiculturalism. But see
Ayelet Shachar, The Puzzle of Interlocking Power Hierarchies: Sharing the Pieces of Jurisdictional
Authority, 35 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 404 (2000) [hereinafter The Puzzle] (arguing that such a
notion "overessentializes the distance between minority group cultures and the dominant state culture,
thereby denying the inevitable interplay between them").
243. IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 28 (1990).
244. See, e.g., Okin, supra note 241, at 23.
245. See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF
MINORITY RIGHTS (1995); Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, 99 ETHICS
883, 894-96 (1989).
246. 1 borrow this term from the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The
Court affords national governments a 'margin of appreciation,' and will not invalidate national action
without good reason. For instance, even though the French policy of discriminating between gay and
straight parents who wish to adopt plausibly violates the European Convention on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, the Court did not strike it down. See Thomas Willoughby Stone, Margin of
Appreciation Gone Awry: The European Court of Human Rights' Implicit Use of the Precautionary
Principle in Frette v. France to Backtrack on Protection from Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual
Orientation, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 271 (2003).
247. Douglas Lee Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance, and the Margin of Appreciation:
Developing a Jurisprudence of Diversity within Universal Human Rights, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391,
450-51 (2001).
248. Ayelet Shachar calls this the "re-universalized citizenship" approach. The Puzzle, supra
note 243, at 403 (2000) (arguing that such an approach "fails to provide room for women (or any other
group members facing systemic risk of internal maltreatment) to maintain their cultural identity").
249. See, e.g., Radhika Coomaraswamy, Identity Within: Cultural Relativism, Minority
Rights and the Empowerment of Women, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 483 (2002).
250. Leti Volpp, Feminism Versus Multiculturalism, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1181, 1195-96
(2001).
251. RAMA MANI, BEYOND RETRIBUTION: SEEKING JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF WAR 49
(2002)
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taken away. 252
The autonomy approach, and by this I mean respect for belief associations
only to the extent that such respect does not interfere with the autonomy of any
individual member,253 is somewhat, but not much, more difficult to impugn. First,
it reifies culture, suggesting that it cannot be changed but only 
corrected.254
Second, it is unjust; it deprives female members of 'oppressive' belief associations
the option of preserving their concomitant membership in the belief association
and in the nation.255 As one female scholar of Islam has commented, "[t]he
majority of Muslim women who are attached to their religion will not be liberated
through the use of a secular approach., 256 And third, it may in fact perpetuate the
oppression of women. In a fascinating study of Shari'a courts, Amira Sorbol has
found, "[o]ne of the main reasons for the change in treatment of women in modem
Shari'ah courts is .... [the] replace[ment][of flexible traditional methodology] by
particular laws suitable to nineteenth-century Nation-State patriarchal
hegemony."2 57
The third approach-the margin of appreciation approach-has more merit.
Israel has implemented the margin of appreciation approach. As Ran Hirschl
describes it, "the Israeli state ... [works to ensure] the right of each community to
demarcate its membership boundaries. 258 While it is possible that this approach
would satisfy both feminists and multiculturalists, especially if it is true that
Islamic law is more feminist than it appears,259 the margin of appreciation
252. Hannah Allam, Iraqi women divided about whether to vote conservative and lose
rights, KNIGHT RIDDER/TRIBUNE, Jan. 11, 2005.
253. The autonomy approach differs from the universal liberal approach in as much as the
autonomy approach does not presume that all women want, for instance, to throw off veils. However,
as soon as a group member expresses dissatisfaction with group norms, any rights the group may hold
fade away.
254. Volpp, supra note 251, at 1192 ("These assumptions [that third-world cultures are
sexist] preclude the understanding that minority cultures, like all cultures, undergo constant
transformation and reshaping."). Madhavi Sunder has persuasively disputed this idea. Madhavi Sunder,
Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 507-508 (2001) [hereinafter Cultural Dissent] ("[W]hile
anthropology evolves, law remains stuck in a century-old understanding of culture. Premised on a
theoretical model that posits and normatively prefers cultural pluralism across groups, law seeks to help
groups maintain their cultural distinctiveness.")
255. See Madhavi Sunder, Piercing the Veil, 112 YALE L. J. 1399 (2003) [hereinafter
Piercing the Veil]; Catherine A. Hardee, Note, Balancing Acts: The Rights of Women and Cultural
Minorities in Kenyan Marital Law, 79 N.Y.U.L. REV. 712, 717 (2004) ("[T]he right to choose one's
cultural or religious beliefs is part of maintaining human dignity.").
256. Azizah al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights, 12 AM.
U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1,3 (1997) [hereinafter Islam, Law and Custom].
257. Amira Sonbol, Women in Shari'ah Courts: A Historical and Methodological
Discussion, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 225, 232-33 (2003). Indeed, that study found that in pre-modem
times, "women came to court for all sorts of reasons. For example, women went to court to record
marriagecontracts and added any conditions they pleased." Id. at 248.
258. Hirschl, supra note 131, at 1840.
259. See Joelle Entelis, Note, International Human Rights: Islam's Friend or Foe?, 20
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1251, 1281-87 (1997); Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the
Treatment of Women: An Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311 (1995);
Asifa Quraishi, Her Honor: An Islamic Critique of the Rape Law of Pakistan from a Woman-Sensitive
Perspective, 18 MICH. J. INT'L L. 287 (1997).
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approach is probably inadequate. When a practice of a belief association is not
within the margin of appreciation, women and other in-group minorities must still
decide between their identity as member of the belief association and their identity
as member of the nation, just as they must when the government adopts an
autonomy approach. Madhavi Sunder, who has made an extensive study of
Afghan women, says, "[the Afghan women's] campaigns present powerful
critiques of current law, which offers women a right to religious freedom (on
leaders' terms) or to equality (within the public sphere), but no right to both. 26 °
Others advocate a twist on the margin of appreciation approach, what one
might call the multiple identity approach. If a government permits a variety of
sub-state groups, including belief associations, significant autonomy, the argument
goes, individuals will be able to construct their identities out of many component
parts and the chances of oppression will be reduced.261 If they are able to draw on
resources by virtue of some component parts of their identities, they will not face
subjugation.
In Iraq there are two axes of potential additional identity formation: tribal and
federal. First, as in Kenya, where "it is not uncommon for a Kenyan to have
multiple identities ... to consider herself a Kenyan, a Masaii, and a Christian, 262 it
is not uncommon for an Iraqi to be at once an Iraqi, a Tikriti, and a Sunni.263
Second, Iraq is, and will likely remain, a federal state; so just as an American may
consider herself an Iowan or a Californian (or indeed an Angelino), so an Iraqi
might consider herself a resident of Anbar or Basra.2 4 However, it is not clear that
feminists would want to encourage the reification of tribal identities. Nor is it
clear, as Peter Schuck has noted, that "[flederalism [will] resolve the political
conflicts generated by diversity . . . [instead of] deepen[ing] and harden[ing]
them, 265 especially since federal division in Iraq more or less tracks sectarian
division. 266 Although there are nuances to this argument-inasmuch as external
pressure may exert more leverage over some component parts of identities than
over others (e.g. no province is likely to want to do without foreign
assistance) 26 7-the multiple identity approach seems little better than the liberal
universal or autonomy approaches.
C. The Design of the Protection Paradigm
260. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1404 (emphasis added).
261. As Peter Spiro has argued, "members of a disadvantaged ethnic group may also be
members of religious, corporate, and other communities that command substantial resources of their
own." Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 632
(1997).
262. Hardee, supra note 256, at 720.
263. On the continuing importance of tribal law throughout the Middle East, and in
Palestine, see lfrah Zilberman, Palestinian Customary Law in the Jerusalem Area, 45 CATH. U.L. REV.
795 (1996).
264. See Schauer, supra note 182, at 1516 (discussing how Americans consider themselves
at once 'black or white,' 'rich or poor,' and American).
265. Schuck, supra note 117, at 212.
266. See, e.g., David E. Sanger, Bush Hails Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2005, at Al(discussing low turnout in the three mainly Sunni provinces).
267. Peter J. Spiro, supra note 262; see also AFG. CONST. art. 7.
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None of the four responses described in the prior section seems adequate.
Rather than focusing on the rights of women and the rights of belief associations,
the better way to blunt the feminist criticism is to focus thoroughly on the rights of
women within groups. That is what the protection paradigm strives to do.
26 8
Women will be secure within belief associations when they have a prominent
role in defining the rules of such associations .269 They must be 
allowed exit. 270
Yet they must also be allowed to remain and redefine the group. The goal of this
section is to articulate "a normative theory of cultural change that allows
individuals a way of imagining autonomous and egalitarian lives outside the
secular, bureaucratic freedom of traditional liberalism [and within groups].",27' To
that end, this section argues that if Iraq complements the privilege paradigm
described in Part II with a system designed to ensure that dissident voices within
belief associations are heard, the feminist critique will not obtain, and the United
States will be able to recommend and commend cooperation, establishment, and
the Constitution itself.
Rather than only resolving disputes when a dissenter brings a particular claim
to the attention of a government decision-maker, the protection paradigm aims to
encourage dissent.27 2 It does so first by using innovative jurisdictional structures
to discipline the courts of belief associations; second by affording members of
belief associations an affirmative right to resources; and third by promulgating
rules for schools that encourage open-mindedness. If dissenters are to be able to
make their voices heard in meaningful ways, belief associations will welcome
complaint and dissenters may feel sufficiently empowered to complain.
1. Jurisdictional Tinkering
Non-traditional jurisdictional structures may provide incentives for the courts
of belief associations to welcome complaint. A court may have independent
268. As I was thinking through the protection paradigm, I drew substantially on the
innovative work of Madhavi Sunder. See Cultural Dissent, supra note 255. Her work persuaded me
that "cultures now more than ever are characterized by cultural dissent," id. at 498, and that those
dissenters require protection. Nevertheless, her work on how best to protect cultural dissent is
remarkably thin. She argues that a "state [sh]ould refuse to reinforce a culture's traditional boundaries
where leaders cannot control the norms of the community on their own." Id. at 558. But of course it is
difficult to determine who is 'in' and who is 'out.' Cf id at 558 n. 353 ("The cultural dissent approach
to freedom of association law I describe deals exclusively with internal challenges made by a group's
members."). For instance, this might require parsing the formal rules and informal norms of expressive
associations to determine the legitimacy of dissenters' claims to membership. Additionally, her
argument is premised on the assumption that dissenters will be confident enough to speak out.
269. See generally The Puzzle, supra note 243; Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1404;
Hardee, supra note 256, at 718 ("[A]II members of a culture should be part of the voice that speaks for
the group.").
270. Bahia Tahzib-Lie, Applying a Gender Perspective in the Area of the Right to Freedom
of Religion or Belief 2000 BYU L. REv. 967, 970 (2000) ("[F]reedom means that women should be
free, at any time, to explore other beliefs and to ... avoid or openly reject a religion or belief if so
inclined.").
271. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1462.
272. But cf Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1466 ("[L]egal decision makers [sh]ould
cease privileging the norms of religious elites and [sh]ould instead place elites and dissenters on an
equal footing - but only when a specific dispute is brought before a decision maker.").
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jurisdiction, it may be subordinate to another court, it may share jurisdiction with
another court over some aspects of a case, but not others,273 or it may exercise
some fourth, ill-defined form of jurisdiction. If the courts of belief associations
exercise independent jurisdiction, dissenters will have no recourse. There will be
no reason for the belief association to welcome complaint.
Hierarchical systems are better. If a court knows that its decisions are subject
to review, it is more likely to welcome complaint. However, a hierarchical system
pits government against belief association, and is subject to the criticism suggested
of the universal liberal and autonomy approaches. Indeed, in the United States for
instance, the Supreme Court will not intervene to resolve religious disputes
precisely because it knows that to do so risks giving grave offense.274 As Frederick
Mark Gedicks has put it, "courts may not resolve disputes among the members of
religious organizations when doing so requires interpretation of the organizations'
dogma or theology, even though courts are free to resolve internal disputes in
secular organizations. ' '275
Fragmented systems-where several courts share jurisdiction over a case-
are better yet. This is the design perfected in the United States. In the United
States, state supreme courts remain the ultimate arbiters of state law, yet the
Supreme Court may review their decisions for compliance with the federal
Constitution. Likewise, the Supreme Court tends to defer to the judgments of
Indian courts unless doing so would result in harm.276 The courts of belief
associations under such a system would be disciplined because they would fear
that if they did not decide cases in responsive fashion, plaintiffs would frequent
rival courts (e.g. in the U.S. context state court plaintiffs would move to federal
court or vice-versa). Such a system "critically challenges discriminatory and
subordinating internal norms and practices by delegating to the group's [courts] the
power to decide whether to risk alienation and exit by upholding [oppressive]
traditions. 277 Indeed, as one commentator has noted, in states like Kenya, where
there are many ways to marry,278 "women [have a] way to express their
preferences and to amplify their voice. 279 The threat of exit is powerful.
Israel has such a fragmented design, and it has worked more or less as
scholars might have predicted 280 : the secular and religious courts have competed
273. These are what Shachar calls hierarchical and fragmented jurisdiction. The Puzzle,
supra note 243, at 409-411.
274. See, e.g., Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976);
Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969);
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 280
U.S. 1 (1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
275. Frederick Mark Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 B.C. L.
REV. 1071, 1074 (2002).
276. Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56
U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 717 (1989).
277. The Puzzle, supra note 243, at 421.
278. Hardee, supra note 256, at 72 1.
279. Id. at 731.
280. For instance, Moussa Abou Ramadan has explained, "[w]ithin [any given legal] field,
there are struggles among the [interpretive] agents themselves .... The agents thereby contribute to the
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with each other for business, and each court has been responsive to the concerns of
those before it. After the passage of Amendment No. 5 to the Family Court Laws,
"disputes concerning custody could be adjudicated in either civil [Israeli] or
Islamic courts."281 Although "the Supreme Court [could] only overturn religious
court rulings which [we]re ultra vires by reason of a denial of natural justice or in
exceptional cases .. .the Supreme Court [wa]s authorized to interpret [religious
law]., 282 This meant that when cases presented questions of both Shari'a and
secular law, both Shari'a courts and the Supreme Court could exercise jurisdiction.
Because the Shari'a court knew the Supreme could reverse their decisions on
Islamic grounds, it began to hand down increasingly liberal and Islamic opinions.
As Abou Moussa Ramadan has explained, "[t]he Shari'a Appeals Court [sought] to
restrict the intervention of the High Court of Justice. 283 This is the advantage of a
fragmented system. It promotes competition between court systems.
Consider another example: Malaysia. Although there is no appeal from the
decisions of the highest Shari'a courts in Malaysia, each federal state is entitled to
set up its own religious courts, and Malaysians are well able to 'jurisdiction shop.'
Some state Shari'a courts permit a man to marry a second wife upon the
declaration of a qadi, whereas others require a full hearing with both the present
and future wife present. 284 Not only have Shari'a courts modernized and
liberalized-they now use procedural rules that are derived in part from the
principles of Islam (including, for instance, the requirement that two witness testify
to an out of court statement) and in part from colonial law (including, for instance,
permitting women to testify)285-but they have done so by updating Islamic law.
286
Ayelet Shachar has suggested a fourth alternative. She believes that
'transformative accommodation' systems might be better than hierarchical or even
287fragmented systems. According to Shachar, such systems are more flexible than
fragmented systems.288 Rather than assigning one court jurisdiction over, say,
ongoing process of change and maintenance of the structures of which they are a part." Moussa Abou
Ramadan, The Transition from Tradition to Reform: The Shari'a Appeals Court Rulings on Child
Custody, 26 FORDHAM. INT'L L.J. 595, 620 (2003). Likewise, Ayelet Shachar has said, when there is no
jurisdictional 'monopoly,' "decision-makers .... benefit from a simultaneously cooperative and
competitive situation ... [and they have] to work that much harder to win the support of their
constituents." AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND
WOMEN'S RIGHTS 121 (2001) [hereinafter MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS].
281. Ramadan, supra note 281, at 596.
282. Id. at 622.
283. Id. at 623.
284. Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic Law Reform and the
Theory of Legal Change, 42 AM. J. CoMP. L. 233, 285 (1994) [hereinafter Horowitz I].
285. Id. at 270-71; see also Donald L. Horowitz, The Qur'an and the Common Law: Islamic
Law Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42. AM. J. COMP. L. 543, 545 (1994) [hereinafter
Horowitz 2] ("[D]ecisions of ... appellate bodies are replete with secular methods of statutory
interpretation, applied even to sacred sources, with common law incrementalism.").
286. Horowitz 2, supra note 286, at 559.
287. See MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 118.
288. She maintains, "transformative accommodation .... guarantees that [both] the state
[and] the group .... [must] abandon their perfectionist and maximalist jurisdictional aspirations."
MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 143.
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family law, and the other court jurisdiction over claims to equality, both courts
could have concurrent jurisdiction over family law, but over different features of
any given case. Shachar offers the following example:
Assume that a divorcing couple has entered marriage through a
religious solemnization. This couple has no children and the only issue
that they have to resolve is how to divide the $10,000 that they
accumulated during the marriage. Suppose that it were clear that the
state distributive rules would award one-half of the sum to each spouse.
This property allocation rule would kick in as soon as proof was
established that the couple has been separated for a minimum period
(perhaps one year), even if the parties are still considered married by the
group's demarcation rules .... [W]ithout the separation of demarcation
and distribution sub-matters, this divorce could degenerate into an
unnecessary legal battle where group-specific gender-biased status
demarcation rules are used to achieve material gain. 289
She suggests, if only a religious court may solemnize divorces, the husband,
who alone may be legally entitled to seek that divorce, might hold out for more
than his fair share of the $10,000.290 Yet if the "woman ... [can] pursue basic
capacities and freedoms in the wake of a separation [under secular rules], some of
her husband's exclusive power will be dissolved., 291 Like fragmented systems,
'transformative accommodation' systems may discipline the courts of belief
associations. But unlike fragmented systems, a transformative accommodation
system permits a group to retain total control "over sub-matters [the group] views
as crucial for cultural survival. 292
Although I agree with much of what Shachar says, I think she goes too far.
The protection paradigm requires the adoption of a fragmented system, not a
transformative accommodation system. I can best explain my skepticism of
transformative accommodation by first describing the jurisdictional structure of
Pakistan. In Pakistan, Shari'a courts have exclusive jurisdiction in certain subject
areas.2 93 Their decisions in other subject areas are amenable to review by the
Supreme Court.294 The problems are, first, that no one is quite clear on who has
the power to declare laws un-Islamic (i.e. unconstitutional), and second, that it is
even less clear who gets to decide who has that power.
By a series of presidential orders promulgated between 1980 and 1985, the
Pakistani government endowed the Federal Shariat Court with the power to hear
289. The Puzzle, supra note 243, at 420.
290. MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS, supra note 281, at 134 ("[Tjhis divorce could
degenerate into an unnecessary legal battle where group-specific gender-biased demarcating-status rules
are used to achieve material gain.").
291. Id.
292. Id. at 144.
293. See Jeffrey A. Redding, Constitutionalizing Islam: Theory and Pakistan, 44 VA. J. INT'L
L. 759, 772 (2004).
294. See id at 771.
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constitutional/Islamic challenges to laws.295 The court has used this power, for
instance, by ruling un-Islamic laws permitting banks to charge interest on their
loans.296 However, the Supreme Court has fought back. It has argued that the
Federal Shariat Court may not rule constitutional provisions un-Islamic; the Court
suggests this is foreclosed by Article 203-B of the Pakistani Constitution. 97
Shari'a judges have offered a sur-reply. They contend that the incorporation into
the Constitution of the Objectives Resolution, which says that Islam is the
'Grundnorm' of society, authorizes them to declare any law, whether statutory or
constitutional, un-Islamic.298
So return to Shachar's hypothetical. What if the husband were to challenge
the state rule requiring equal division of marital assets? Who would decide
whether the rule comported with religious principles? Moreover, if there was
dispute on this question, who would decide who could decide? A fragmented
system, because it has clearer lines of authority, is a better choice for a nation like
Iraq, already embroiled in considerable chaos.
There is no reason to think that a fragmented system would be inimical to
Islam. In fact, there are four juridical schools of Muslim legal scholarship299 and
these schools developed and grew strong by competing with each other for
adherents. Originally, there were "no less than nineteen schools of fiqh (fiqh
madhhabs). 30 0 As George Makdisi has put it:
[D]isagreement (khildj) leads to disputation (mundzara) the purpose of
which [was] to defend the validity of one's own opinion ... and to
convince the opponent of its validity, or reduce him to silence by
destroying his thesis ... legal opinions were pitted against one another,
and the best-defended opinion survived. °1
He calculates, "[s]ome five hundred schools of law . .. disappeared at or
about the beginning of the third/ninth century." 302  Even once the number of
madhab had been narrowed to four, those four remained in stiff competition with
each other. As Chibli Mallat has explained, the Egyptian sultan "Baybars (ruled
295. Charles H. Kennedy, Repugnancy to Islam-Who Decides? Islam and Legal Reform in
Pakistan, 41 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 769, 772 (1992).
296. See id at 783-84; Chibli Mallat, Commercial Law in the Middle East: Between
Classical Transactions and Modern Business, 48 AM. J. COMP. L. 81, 126 (2000).
297. Kennedy, supra note 295, at 772.
298. Id. at 780.
299. See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 144, at 138. If you count Shi'ism, there are five such
schools.
300. Irshad Abdal-Haqq, Islamic Law: An Overview of Its Origin and Elements, 7 J. ISLAMIC
L. & CULTURE 27,38 (2002).
301. George Makdisi, The Significance of the Sunni Schools of Law in Islamic Religious
History, 10 INT'L J. MIDDLE E. STUD. 1,3 (1979).
302. Id. see also Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Globalization and Jurisprudence: An Islamic
Law Perspective, 54 EMORY L.J. 25, 43 (2005) ("[T]he subsequent development and spread of these
schools has been influenced by a variety of political, social, and demographic factors. These factors
sometimes resulted in shifting the influence of some schools from one region to another, confining them
to certain parts, as is the case with Shi'ah schools at present, or even the total extinction of some schools
like those of al-Thawri and al-Tabari in the Sunni tradition.").
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from 658-675 & 1260-1277) ... appointed qadis ... along strict quadripartite lines
of the judiciary." 30 3 The situation remains unchanged today. Indeed, "in most
other countries, several schools co-exist, and the integration efforts attempted by
the state [are] carried out through the process of takhayyur (choice, eclecticism),
and not through the imposition of any one school. ' 3°
Competition is not only theoretically congenial to Islam, but it has also been
adopted in Muslim countries. Indeed, Egypt has a de facto fragmented jurisdiction
system. In 1980, Egypt amended its Constitution and began to require that laws
conform to the Shari'a. If a citizen believes that a law is un-Islamic, he may bring
suit in the Supreme Court.30 5 On the one hand, the Supreme Court must consider
such suits carefully, since many jurists believe that only they are competent to say
what the Shari'a requires; 30 6 the Supreme Court has acknowledged, its
"interpretations of the Qur'an are supposed to be validated by the agreement of the
[Islamic] schools. 30 7 On the other hand, the Court may not strike down laws
willy-nilly since to do so would be to reject the people's will, expressed by the
legislature; Supreme Court justices are aware of the "malleability of the [Shari'a]"
and are leery of anointing themselves all powerful arbiters of Egypt's laws. 30 8 The
Court, therefore, has struck "a balance between 'normative Islamic principles' and
Egypt's 'democratic character.' 30 9  Disciplined by the Islamists and the
legislature, it has sought to retain its constituents by rendering opinions that are at
once Islamic but also liberal. In fact, it has taken the same tack as that taken by the
Shari'a courts in Israel.
Consider first the claim of a woman whose husband refused to pay the
alimony required by the Personal Status Laws of Egypt because he believed the
Personal Status Laws were un-Islamic. The Court said, "legislation should not
contradict those Islamic Sharia principles that [are] derived from definitive sources
and which representf] the religious foundations of Egyptian society., 310 The Court
explained that it would "make sure that the peremptory provisions of the Shari'a
are applied on all laws .... [and also] make sure that ijtihad [interpretation of
303. Chibli Mallat, From Islamic to Middle Eastern Law: A Restatement of the Field (Part
.1), 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 209,270 (2004).
304. ld. at 275.
305. See Ran Hirschl, Resituating the Judicialization of Politics: Bush v. Gore as a Global
Trend, 15 CANADIAN J.L. &JURISPRUDENCE 191, 197 & n.21 (2002).
306. Clark Benner Lombardi, Note, Islamic Law as a Source of Constitutional Law in Egypt:
The Constitutionalization of the Sharia in a Modem Arab State, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 81, 115(1998) ("Islamists generally insist that only professional Islamic scholars can properly identify and
apply the principles of the Sharia. Such scholars alone have the training required to interpret properly
the Qur'an and Sunna."). In fact, one prominent law professor has proposed that Egypt empanel a
number ofjurists to review Supreme Court interpretations of Islamic law. Id. at 116.
307. Id. at 116.
308. Id. at 122.
309. Scott Kent Brown 11, Note, The Coptic Church in Egypt: A Comment on Protecting
Religious Minorities from Nonstate Discrimination, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1049, 1085.
310. Hatem Aly Labib Gabr, The Interpretation of Article Two of the Egyptian Constitution
by the Supreme Constitutional Court, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREME CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF EGYPT 217, 221 (Kevin Boyle & Adel Omar Sherif eds., 1996)
(emphasis added).
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Shari'a] in the non-peremptory provisions are achieving the interest of the
people., 311  In one fell swoop, the Court combined Islamic and democratic
principles. It defined Shari'a for constitutional purposes as only those Islamic laws
the Egyptian people could agree upon. As Clark Benner Lombardi has put it, the
Court held, "fundamental principles are [those] laid down in the Qur'an and [that]
have been accepted, at least implicitly, by all schools of Islamic law over the
years. 312 Only laws that are incongruent to those principles are to be struck down.
On another occasion, the Egyptian Supreme Court "was presented with the
issue of the constitutionality of Article 11 of the 1929 Law on the family, which
gives the judge the right to grant a woman a divorce upon a determination that
reconciliation with the spouse is impossible. 313  The plaintiff argued that the
Qur'an establishes that divorce is a male prerogative.3 14 The Court agreed.31 5
Nevertheless, the Court contended, "there [is] another determinate rule in the
Quran that [is] relevant to the dispute, the rule requiring the appointment of an
arbitrator from each spouse's family to reconcile the spouses in the case of
dispute." 316 Because the Court did not believe the principle the plaintiff had cited
to be one to which Egyptian society had acquiesced, it refused to strike down the
law.
2. Affirmative Rights
Jurisdictional tinkering is not enough. Eric Mitnick has explained, "a model
premised on individual agency in a multicultural context must, at a minimum,
provide for the sort of social, educational, and financial resources at-risk group
members require to recognize, and take advantage of, jurisdictional options. 317
Madhavi Sunder likewise notes, "[i]n many cases, communities may lack serious
dissent. 3 18 Additionally, "practical and cultural constraints... may indeed be so
deep and powerful as to block individuals from exercising any choice., 319 Finally,
Sally Engle Merry has said, although "state law penetrates and restructures other
normative orders through symbols and through direct coercion .... at the same
time ... non-state normative orders resist and circumvent penetration or even
capture and use the symbolic capital of state law." 320 The protection paradigm,
therefore, requires the government to take affirmative steps to ensure that those
who wish to dissent from within their belief associations are able to do so. This is
311. John Murray & Mohamed EI-Molla, Islamic Shari'a and Constitutional Interpretation
in Egypt, in DEMOCRACY, THE RULE OF LAW AND ISLAM 507, 513 (Eugene Cotran & Adel Omar Sherif
eds., 1999) (emphasis added).
312. Lombardi, supra note 307, at 97.
313. Lama Abu-Odeh, Modernizing Muslim Family Law: The Case of Egypt, 37 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 1043, 1139 (2004).
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Eric J. Mitnick, Individual Vulnerability and Cultural Transformation, 101 MICH. L.
REV. 1635, 1660 (2003) (book review).
318. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1467.
319. Henry J. Steiner, Ideals and Counter-Ideals in the Struggle over Autonomy Regimes for
Minorities, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1539, 1553 (1991).
320. Sally Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 869, 881 (1988).
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the second component of the protection paradigm. In this sub-subsection, I argue
that the Iraqi government should financially support dissenters.
I argue that a government adopting the protection paradigm should adopt a
variant of the model of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution
proposed by Owen Fiss. Fiss has urged that instead of "a shield, . . . [as] a means
of protecting the individual speaker from being silenced by the state," 321 courts
should understand the First Amendment as endowing individuals with the ability to
make affirmative claims on the state, demanding the use of state power to "resist
the pressures of the market and thus to enlarge and invigorate our politics. '322 A
government adopting the protection paradigm should ensure that those whose
voices are marginalized within a belief association are vested with the right to
make affirmative claims on state resources in order to permit them better to raise
their voices and visibility.
323
I will offer two examples to explain what I mean. First, consider the history
of campaign finance reform in the United States. Sensible to the fact that many
believe "restrictions on the speech of some [are permitted] in order to prevent a
few from drowning out the many,, 32 4 the U.S. government has permitted "massive
subsidies of a wide variety of sorts. 325 These subsidies are intended to facilitate
the popular participation that is the necessary precondition to democracy.32 6 Even
Robert Post, who in general has been skeptical of Fiss's interpretation of the First
Amendment, admits "the possibility that the achievement of democratic values
may, in discrete circumstances, require carefully bounded structures of managerial
control. The narrow objective of such structures should be the correction of
conditions which cause disabling citizen disaffection. 32 7 These subsidies have
taken several forms. To name two, the government has required TV stations to be
even-handed in the distribution of airtime328 and the government continues to fund
the political campaigns of candidates who might not otherwise be able to afford to
321. Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986).
322. Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, 100 HARv. L. REV. 781, 794 (1987).
323. See Shane O'Neill, The Equalization of Effective Communicative Freedom: Democratic
Justice in the Constitutional State and Beyond, 17 CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 83, 87 (2004)
("The flow of undistorted communication that originates in [the] 'wild' public sphere must be protected
by a set of constitutional rights that makes equal citizenship socially effective for all .... [including]
[]equal access to the sources of communicative power.")
324. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402 (2000) (Breyer, J., concurring).
For a recent description of the equality goal, see Yoav Dotan, Campaign Finance Reform and the Social
Inequality Paradox, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 955 (2004). Justice Stephen Breyer is its most prominent
champion on the bench; he has said of campaign finance reform, it "helps to maintain a form of
government open to participation .... [by] democratiz[ing] the influence that money can bring to bear."
Stephen Breyer, Our Democratic Constitution, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 245, 253 (2002).
325. Guy Pessach, Media, Markets, and Democracy: Revisiting an Eternal Triangle, 17
CANADIAN J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 209, 212 (2004) (quoting C. Edwin Baker).
326. See J.M. Balkin, Populism and Progressivism as Constitutional Categories, 104 YALE
L.J. 1935, 1948-49 (1995) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH (1993)).
327. Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual Autonomy and the Reform of Public
Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109, 1134 (1993).
328. Cf Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Fed. Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding right of
reply regulations imposed on television broadcasters).
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329
Consider next the case of Mukhtaran Bibi, a woman gang-raped in Pakistan.
Her case might not have come to light if not for the New York Times. 330  But
international donors have delivered significant money to her. She has started a
school. 33 1  Furthermore, "[s]he has also emerged as a ferocious spokeswoman
against honor killings, rapes and acid attacks on women." 332  If a government
wishes to adhere to the protection paradigm, it, rather than Mercy Corps, should
deliver funds to dissenters.333
3. Liberal Education
Not only should a government establish a competitive jurisdictional structure
and help dissenters express themselves, it should also open the eyes of belief
association members to their options. This requires the government to assist
potential dissenters in developing "the necessary cognitive skills that allow them to
evaluate critically a variety of competing claims. 334 As Leila Sayeg and Adriaen
Morse note, "no single right is as important as education, as it alone forms the
basis of women's ability to affect Muslim society and determine for themselves the
correct application of Islam to their needs. 335 Sunder concurs. She says, unless a
state ensures "women equal access to educational ... institutions ... at all levels"
women are unlikely ever to exercise their right to complain about repressive belief
association behavior.
336
There is no doubt that those most capable of criticizing themselves and others
are those who are at once culturally grounded3 37 and yet who have also been
exposed to a variety of opinions at an early age.3 38 Most agree that an effective
329. See generally John M. de Figueiredo & Elizabeth Garrett, Paying for Politics, 78 S.
CAL. L. REV. 591 (2005).
330. See, e.g., Nicholas D. Kristof, The 11-Year-Old Wife, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2005, at
A21; Nicholas D. Kristof, A Free Woman, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2005, at 413.
331. Nicholas D. Kristof, Raped, Kidnapped and Silenced, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2005, at
A23.
332. Id.
333. Nor is this a pipedream. With United States prodding, the TNA has funded and assisted
in the development of new radio stations, television stations, and other media outlets. See Measuring
Stability and Security in Iraq, at 8 (Oct. 2005), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Oct2005/d2005l0l3iraq.pdf (noting that "[flrom no independent
media under Saddam, there are now 44 commercial television stations, 72 commercial radio stations,
and more than 100 independent newspapers and magazines that represent all points of Iraq's political
spectrum")
334. O'Neill, supra note 324, at 93.
335. Leila P. Sayeh & Adriaen M. Morse, Jr., Islam and the Treatment of Women: An
Incomplete Understanding of Gradualism, 30 TEX. INT'L L.J. 311, 324 (1995).
336. Piercing the Veil, supra note 256, at 1468.
337. Yael Tamir suggests, "individuals are members of particular human communities.
Outside such communities they cannot develop a language and a culture, or set themselves aims." YAEL
TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 7 (1993).
338. In a state that has adopted the privilege paradigm, the concern of Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg that "schools' seemingly objective appeal to individual reason plainly inculcate[s] the
values of individual choice, toleration, and reason -- values that, rather than transcending culture, derive
from and reproduce a liberal, pluralist society," simply has no bite. Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew
A Circle That Shut Me Out ": Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106
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school system is the best way of developing citizens who share these two
characteristics. 339 As Meira Levinson has explained, the state must endow children
with "a plurality of constitutive desires and values .... [Such] enables individuals
to question any particular value without suffering a wholesale loss of identity. 34 °
But what kind of school system could an overtly Islamic state adopt that would do
so? The answer I give is that the protection paradigm requires the Iraqi
government either to ensure that all schools teach what we might call "civics" or to
establish a uniform national curriculum, permitting each school to deviate from
that curriculum only to the extent necessary to teach the religion it supports.
Two additional points are important at this juncture. First, religious schools
are not necessarily incapable of serving a liberal educational function.341
Rosemary Salomone has argued, "[t]he assertion that [a] religious orientation
impairs [one's] ability to participate effectively in the democratic process or to
engage in republican deliberation is purely speculative. 342 Second, the notion of
universal education is entirely compatible with Islam. 343  In fact, Imam Shafi'i
once said that a ruler has a duty to ensure that all the people in a province are
HARV. L. REV. 581, 612-13 (1993). Stanley Ingber's concern, that "[c]hildren are unlikely to
internalize the value of and a belief in individual autonomy if their schools appear to trivialize and
ignore it systematically," is a deeper one. Stanley lngber, Socialization, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of
Orthodoxy": Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 73 (1987). However, at
root, the state must privilege "the . . . political community." Stephen Macedo, Transformative
Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism,
POLITICAL THEORY 26 No. 1, at 59 (1998).
339. Schools are effective arena for the communication of ideas. See MARK G. YUDOF,
WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 213 (1983) ("[P]ublic schools are a communications theorist's dream: the
audience is captive and immature ... and a system of rewards and punishments is available to reinforce
the messages."). Moreover, as Bruce Ackerman has explained, "[a] system of liberal education
provides children with a sense of the very different lives that could be theirs ... [while insuring that
their] need for cultural coherence [is met]." ACKERMAN, supra note 164, at 139; see also MEIRA
LEVINSON, THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION 31 (1999) [hereinafter THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL
EDUCATION] ("[A] coherent, attractive conception of autonomy must incorporate .... a commitment to
the development and preservation of cultural coherence ... [and] develop[ment] ... of a wide range of
faculties."). Cf Amy Gutmann, Children Paternalism, and Education, PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC
AFFAIRS 9 No. 4, at 349 (1980) (the state must ensure that children are "capable of choosing between
alternative conceptions of the good and of participating intelligently in democratic politics")
340. THE DEMANDS OF LIBERAL EDUCATION, supra note 340, at 33; see also Amy Gutmann,
Civic Education and Social Diversity, ETHICS 105 No. 3, at 557 (1995) ("At issue here is not mere
exposure to different ways of life for the sake of giving children more choices among good lives but,
rather, teaching future citizens to evaluate different political perspectives that are often associated with
different ways of life.").
341. As Rosemary Salomone has explained, we should not assume that "accommodating
religious views in the curriculum would necessarily compromise liberal autonomy, democratic
citizenship, or republican deliberation." Rosemary C. Salomone, Common Schools, Uncommon Values:
Listening to the Voices of Dissent, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 169, 215 (1996). In fact, nationalizing and
centralizing the madrasa school system would create many positive externalities. Some madrasas in
peripheral provinces, little supervised by national authorities, are havens for fundamentalists and
terrorists. Children who went to state-run religious schools, rather than such madrasas, might be less
susceptble to terrorist recruiters.
342. Id. at 216.
343. Asma Afasaruddin, Religious Education and the Liberal State: Muslim Views on
Education: Parameters, Purview, and Possibilities, 44 J. CATH. LEG. STUD. 143, 178 (2005) ("[T]he
project of regenerating and revamping faith-based schools in Islamic societies-existing alongside
secular schools-is quite feasible based on religiously-mandated core principles.").
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educated.3 " Moreover, the Afghan Constitution recognizes that education should
be universal.345 A recent empirical study has found that in Lebanon, Muslim girls
have received more education than their male counterparts.
346
But how would either version of the protection paradigm look? Consider first
the contemporary experience of Germany (and several other European states).
German public schools teach religion where "religion classes are treated as
ordinary subjects. They are taught on equivalent terms as other classes, are totally
integrated in the school's curriculum and schedule, and are graded like other
subjects. '347 As one commentator has summarized, at some schools "grades for
religion classes are not listed on school report cards. [At other schools,] grades are
listed but do not affect graduation or further education, and [at yet a third set of
schools], religion grades are treated the same as grades for other subjects. 348 The
"[s]tate authorities are entitled to request reports and information from schools and
have the power to lustrate the operation of the school., 349 Thus, in this version,
Iraqi public schools could each teach their own brands of religion, alongside a
uniform secular curriculum.
Consider next madrasas in Pakistan. The Pakistani government has slowly
begun to press madrasas to teach what we might call civics. 350 While this has
provoked some resistance, the plan is entirely consistent with the history and
development of madrasas in Pakistan and throughout the Middle East.
Historically, "madaris [madrasas] ...were used to propagate state ideology.
3 51
More recently, as Pervez Hoodbhoy has explained, madrasas have been "an
instrument for forging a ...national identity. 352 In this version, Iraqi schools
would teach civics classes in addition to giving religious instruction.
IV. THE NEW IRAQI CONSTITUTION: A SECOND ASSESSMENT
I have praised the Iraqi Constitution because it ensures the government will
cooperate with belief associations and because it establishes Islam (a necessary
corollary to cooperation). Yet Iraq should also cleave to the protection paradigm.
First, the Iraqi government should interpret the ambiguous provisions of the
Constitution describing the future judicial structure of the country to provide for
fragmented jurisdiction. Article 90 requires that members of the Supreme Court be
344. Islam, Law and Custom, supra note 257, at 37. Likewise, Abu Hanifah argued in
favor of broad education. Id.
345. AFG. CONST. art. 44.
346. Mandana Hajj, Islam and Female Education: Evidence from Individual-Level Data *3-
4 (unpublished) (on file with the author and available through SSRN).
347. Garlicki, supra note 28, at 505.
348. Id.
349. Id. at 497.
350. See generally International Crisis Group, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the
Military (29 July 2002), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org.
351. Aziz Talbani, Pedagogy, Power, and Discourse: Transformation of Islamic Education,
COMP. EDUC. REV. 40, No. 1, at 71 (1996).
352. PEREZ HOODBHOY, IDEOLOGICAL PROBLEMS FOR SCIENCE IN PAKISTAN, IN ISLAM,
POLITICS AND THE STATES 174 (Asghar Khan ed., 1985); id at 76.
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"experts in (Islamic Jurisprudence) and law." 353 From the Arabic, it is not clear
whether all judges must be experts in both kinds of law or whether some must be
experts in Islamic law and some in secular law. The distinction is an important
one. If it is the former, the court could look something like the Egyptian Supreme
Court. If the latter, it would look more like the Pakistani Supreme Court. The
former is far preferable.
In crafting and implementing legislation establishing the Federal Supreme
Court, Iraqis should take care that the Supreme Court shares jurisdiction with local
courts, both religious and regional. Article 39 provides, "Iraqis are free in their
adherence to their personal status according to their own religion, sect, belief and
choice, and that will be organized by law.' 0 54 Some have read this to mean that
Shi'a, Sunnis, Christians, and members of other belief associations are free to
organize independent court systems.3 55 The Iraqi government should endorse this
reading and strive to spur competition between sectarian and federal courts in ways
that conduce to the moderation of both. Iraq, as Afghanistan has not, should
ensure that multiple religious viewpoints can successfully be presented in court.
3 56
The Constitution also permits Iraqi provinces to establish their own legal
systems.357 Indeed, the Kurds are apparently in the process of drafting a regional
Constitution. 58 This is to the good, and the government should encourage it.
Indeed, the establishment of regional legal systems and courts may provoke the
kind of jurisdictional competition that has arisen in Malaysia. As one Malaysian
scholar has explained by way of example, when "the Gombak district Syariah
[court] declared that the male privilege of pronouncing unilateral divorce upon his
wife . . . was permissible even if effected by short messaging service . . . [the
353. IRAQ CONST. art. 90.
354. Id. at art. 39.
355. See ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224 ("[lI]t is clear that individuals must be
offered the option of following sectarian law.")
356. The new Afghan Constitution "requires that courts render decisions based on
'provisions of the Hanafi jurisprudence' when 'there is no provision in the Constitution or the laws with
respect to a case."' Tad Stahnke & Robert C. Blitt, The Religion-State Relationship and the Right to
Freedom of Religion or Belief: A Comparative Textual Analysis of the Constitutions of Predominantly
Muslim Countries *I I (unpublished) (on file with the author and available through SSRN). An
analogous provision of the 1964 Afghan Constitution was one the roots of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan. Hanafi jurisprudence is particularly strict; see Bharathi A. Venkatraman, Islamic States
and the United Nations Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Discrimination Against Women:
Are the Shari'a and the Convention Compatible?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1949, 1970-71 (1995), and it had
no competition, see Travis, supra note 9, at 22 (the 1964 Constitution "required Afghan court[s] to
render justice in cases not controlled by the Constitution or statutory law 'by following the basic
principles of the Hanafi jurisprudence of the Shari'a of Islam"')
357. See ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224 ("By regional standards, the list of
those areas that are exclusively the responsibility of the central government is remarkably short."). Cf
United States Institute of Peace, Iraq at a Juncture (Sept. 2005)
http://www.usip.org/newsmedia/releases/2005/1005-iraq.html (quoting Peter Galbraith to the effect that
Shia leaders initially negotiated for an Iranian-style Guardian Council, despite objections over the use
of the court solely as a vehicle to ensure legislative alignment with Islam; as a compromise, Galbraith
noted, the Court was stripped of its power to review regional legislation.)
358. ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 224. Cf IRAQ CONST. art. 116.
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decision inspired] both ire and endorsement., 359  Just as Malaysian courts have
imposed different conditions upon a husband who wishes to take a second wife,
"from relatively more demanding to almost negligible, 360 so courts have freely
chosen either to adhere to the Gombak precedent or reject it. Iraq should foster
this kind of competition between regional courts; it is a recipe for dissent within
belief associations.
36 1
Not only should it strive to promote jurisdictional competition, but the Iraqi
government should also vest the Supreme Court with a responsibility to promote
ijtihad (independent interpretation of Islamic precepts).362 The Iraqi government
should also explicitly grant the government the ability to refer constitutional
questions to the Supreme Court363 since it is generally true that as the number of
constitutional references goes up so too does judicial responsiveness to rights
364assertions.
Second, the Iraqi government should take affirmative steps to insure that
(potential) dissenters have all the resources they need to express their opinions.365
Although Article 36 of the Constitution affirms the freedom of the press and of
opinion, it leaves open how these freedoms are to be realized.366 The legislature
should immediately offer subsidies to those wishing to express disfavored
opinions.3 67 This is not a farfetched proposal. Iraq is one of the few countries in
the world that requires that a certain proportion of its elected officials be
women.368 Iraqis clearly have no aversion to principled affirmative action.
Third and finally, Article 34 affirms the importance of a national educational
scheme, but provides no details. The Iraqi government should, as soon as
practicable, pass a law either establishing a uniform national educational system,
359. Jacelyn Ling-Chien Neo, "Anti-God, Anti-Islam and Anti-Quran ": Expanding the
Range of Participants and Parameters Over Women's Rights and Islam in Malaysia *33 (unpublished)
(on file with the author and available through SSRN).
360. Id. at *56.
361. Cf supra text accompanying note 286.
362. ALGERIA CONST. art. 171.
363. Cf AFG. CONST. ch. 7 art. 121.
364. Cf Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Politics in France and Germany *203-207 (on file
with the author).
365. Other Middle Eastern countries have constitutional or legal provisions that impose such
a requirement on the government. See, e.g., SYRIA CONST. ART. 45 (requiring the government to insure
that women have "all opportunities enabling them to fully and effectively participate in the social,
cultural, and economic life.")
366. IRAQ CONST. art. 36(2).
367. The Iraqi government eliminated what had been Article 44 of the August draft from the
Constitution it presented to the people on October 15. Cf ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY, supra note
224. That article provided, "[a]ll individuals shall have the right to enjoy all the rights mentioned in the
international treaties and agreements concerned with human rights." If possible, the substance of this
article should also be restored, as lawsuits brought by human rights groups may be an effective way to
insure that dissenters within belief associations are given the resources and opportunities the protection
paradigm counsels that Iraq assure them. Cf Anupam Chander, Globalization and Distrust, 114 YALE
L.J. 1193, 1229 (2005) (suggesting that discrete and insular minorities have turned to international law
and norms to secure vindication of their rights in national courts).
368. IRAQ CONST. art. 48(1).
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as the Afghans have, 3 69 or requiring all schools, whether public or private, to teach
a civics class.
The Iraqis need not do this alone. These measures are preconditions to United
States support for the Constitution (and to U.S. withdrawal); the United States
should use its influence to ensure that Iraqis put them into effect. Indeed, this
article has argued that the ethics and practicalities of state-and-nation-building
require the United States to endorse efforts by the Iraqi government to cooperate
with belief associations. It has also sought to demonstrate that this commitment
entails a corollary endorsement of establishment. But the privilege paradigm is
meaningless without insuring protection for those who might dissent from within
belief associations. That should be the next U.S. priority.
369. See supra text accompanying note 340.
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